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Introduction 
 
Financialization as a 
Megatrend of Contemporary Capitalism 
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Dealing with megatrends is never simple. Especially not if they are the subject of scientific analysis 
with the goal of creating new insights into the inner workings of things by precise theoretical rea-
soning and empirical verification. In a way, megatrends are double-edged swords. On the one hand, 
their appeal is temptingly practical as the denominate broad phenomena that almost everybody 
sooner or later has come across. On the other hand, this very same breadth can just be a means of 
camouflaging their fuzziness. In political economy there has been a number of megatrends that 
always carry the danger of becoming mere buzzwords and empty phrases due to conceptual over-
stretching and arbitrary application. One of the more prominent examples, if not the most promi-
nent one, is “globalization” – a term that does not wither and can be filled with a plethora of 
different meanings, each emphasizing specific aspects of a larger phenomenon. However, if appro-
priately applied, megatrends can also be useful to identify, describe and analyze fundamental, struc-
tural trends, which keep unfolding over longer periods of time and alter the character and form of 
appearance of the things. In the realm of financial markets, and especially the people who study 
them, another catchphrase has been become increasingly popular within the last ten years. It is the 
term “financialization”, which, I argue, describes one of those megatrends. More precisely, a meg-
atrend in the development of contemporary capitalism. This dissertation is about “financialization”, 
which can be widely captured by Gerald Epstein’s famous first approximation as “the increasing 
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the opera-
tion of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005b: 3). Dealing with specific traits 
of this overarching rise of finance – forms of debt, regionally varying levels, the state-financial 
market nexus and changes in alternative banking – I hope to partially fill some gaps and make a 
contribution to this vivid, yet heterogeneous field of research, which tells us much about capitalist 
dynamics. 
 
Before going in medias res, the remainder of this introductory chapter offers a compressed overview 
of the three separate papers, which form the basis of this cumulative dissertational thesis. Ahead 
of that, I commence with some initial remarks on the distinctiveness of financialization by first 
providing a cursory ride through some classics in political economic thinking. This serves the pur-
pose of being able to better differentiate what is new about financialization. Secondly, I then briefly 
sketch the history and development of the concept. Purposefully, I leave out its different defini-
tions as well as lengthy treatises on the various branches going along with them. For this I would 
like to refer to the individual chapters, each providing brief discussions and reflections on termi-
nology and relevant contributions to the field.  
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While finance had been anything but unknown to scholars from such disciplines as political econ-
omy, economic sociology or economics, the latest global financial crisis since 2007 has certainly 
provoked renewed interest in matters of financial markets. Before, pundits – inside and outside 
academia – were largely convinced that the economy had entered a “new era”, as one Financial 
Times writer summed up the general euphoria of the late 1990s (Dudley 1998). Sure, there had been 
critical voices, especially after the eruptions that shattered many East Asian economies in 1997 or 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. However, warnings by prominent insiders such as 
George Soros, who spoke of a “crisis of global capitalism” (1998), did not alter expert perception. 
Instead, discussions circled around whether growth could continue forever and if the Dow Jones 
record high of 36,000 was actually not still undervaluing the economy (Dornbusch 1998; Glass-
mann and Hassett 1999). Nearly two decades and a string of crisis events – from mortgages, to 
banks, to public debt to the euro as a currency – later, no serious commentator would doubt that 
financial markets cannot be simple reduced to efficiency enhancing, information processing, funds 
channeling entities. Rather the opposite seems true and the notion of an inherent instability to 
finance, which was for instance prominently formulated by Minsky as early as the 1960s, might be 
more widespread than ever, although memory can start fading quickly (Minsky 2016).  
 
In contrast to public perception, the tradition of political economy has ever since its emergence as 
a discipline acknowledged the critical and ambiguous importance of financial markets as a constit-
uent feature of capitalist development. One might say that, in many ways, finance even anteceded 
the social and economic system of capitalism and sparked both its formation and various transfor-
mations. In fact, without finance the historical transitions, which unfolded over several stages from 
early merchant capital to the establishment of the factory system, the Industrial Revolution, subse-
quent progress in chemicals and IT, as well as the age of free trade and globalization, would not 
have been possible (Frieden 2012). Consequently, classic writings regularly mention the role of 
finance for economic and political dynamics. We might exemplarily look at three seminal works by 
some of the intellectual founding fathers of political economic thinking to distill key features of 
how they perceived finance in the pre-financialization phase.  
 
In his General Economic History from 1927, Max Weber extensively writes about the preconditions 
for the establishment of capitalism. Pursuing his general theme of a continuous rationalization 
process, he mainly points out to progress in production techniques, commerce, citizenship and the 
state. Yet he also states that  
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“in modern economic life the issue of credit instruments is a means for the rational assem-
bly of capital. Under this head belongs especially the stock company. This represents a 
culmination of two different lines of development. In the first place, share capital may be 
brought together for the purpose of anticipating revenues. (…) Another economically more 
important form of association is that for the purpose of financing commercial enterprise – 
although the evolution toward the association most familiar today in the industrial field, 
stock company, went forward very gradually from this beginning” (Weber 1999: 45)   
  
However, what becomes clear from this quote is that Weber understood finance first and foremost 
regarding two core principles: rationalization and financing of investments. He thus, at least im-
plicitly, assumes a functional logic behind it. To some extent Weber’s historical account comple-
ments Marx’ historical derivation of the origins of capitalism, in which the latter puts more emphasis 
on exploitation and primitive accumulation (Marx 1990 [1867]: Ch. 26). Yet, when speaking about 
finance, Marx logical derivation offers even more insights. Although he limits his scope in the third 
volume of Capital (1894) by mentioning that 
 
“an exhaustive analysis of the credit system and of the instruments, which it creates for its 
own use (credit-money, etc.) lies beyond our plan. We merely wish to dwell here upon a 
few particular points, which are required to characterize the capitalist mode of production 
in general. We shall deal only with commercial and bank credit. The connection between 
the development of this form of credit and that of public credit will not be considered 
here” (Marx 1991: 525),  
 
Marx later on in the same chapter develops his concept of fictitious capital, as a form of capital 
which exemplifies only legal claims on future profits, can be sold and traded but has no direct 
connection to productive financing in first place. In doing so he differentiates fictitious capital from 
money capital (such as loans) and real capital, that is bound to productive processes and the crea-
tion of surplus value. While both, Weber and Marx, in their own way noted the perils of the finan-
cial system, such as speculation and regularly recurring crises, it seems fair to say that they did not 
fully account for the potential of political and economic power which finance could develop. To 
have pointed to this is the merit of Rudolf Hilferding, the third and final author of this succinct 
review. In his key text Finance Captital, originally published in 1910, Hilferding analyzes the emer-
gence of what he calls organized capitalism. In contrast to previous phases of liberal or competitive 
capitalism, its organized form is dominated by the amalgamation of banks with industrial corpora-
tions, most importantly via the expansion of stock companies. To illustrate his argument in a nut-
shell, it is useful to quote at length: 
 
“The dependence of industry on the banks is therefore a consequence of property relation-
ships. An ever-increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the industrialists 
who use it. They are able to dispose over capital only through the banks, which represent 
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the owners. On the other side, the banks have to invest an ever-increasing part of their 
capital in industry and in this way they become to a greater and greater extent industrial 
capitalists. I call bank capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually transformed 
in this way into industrial capital, finance capital. So far as its owners are concerned, it 
always retains the money form; it is invested by them in the form of money capital, interest-
bearing capital, and can always be withdrawn by them as money capital. But in reality the 
greater part of the capital so invested with the banks is transformed into industrial, produc-
tive capital (means of production and labour power) and is invested in the productive pro-
cess. An ever-increasing proportion of the capital used in industry is finance capital, capital 
at the disposition of the banks which is used by the industrialists. 
 
Finance capital develops with the development of the joint-stock company and reaches its 
peak with the monopolization of industry. Industrial earnings acquire a more secure and 
regular character, and so the possibilities for investing bank capital in industry are extended. 
But the bank disposes of bank capital, and the owners of the majority of the shares in the 
bank dominate the bank. It is clear that with the increasing concentration of property, the 
owners of the fictitious capital which gives power over the banks, and the owners of the 
capital which gives power over industry, become increasingly the same people. As we have 
seen, this is all the more so as the large banks increasingly acquire the power to dispose 
over fictitious capital. 
 
We have seen how industry becomes increasingly dependent upon bank capital, but this 
does not mean that the magnates of industry also become dependent on banking magnates. 
As capital itself at the highest stage of its development becomes finance capital, so the 
magnate of capital, the finance capitalist, increasingly concentrates his control over the 
whole national capital by means of his domination of bank capital. Personal connections 
also play an important role here.” (Hilferding 2006 [1910]: 226-227) 
 
 
This brief excursion to classical texts of political economy has demonstrated the presence of fi-
nance, financial markets and finance capital in the works of some of its most prominent thinkers. 
However, I would like to stress that the phenomenon of financialization is something particular 
and new to the developments of capitalism. Albeit all three authors mention some important as-
pects of finance – functionality, speculation, credit provision or even power – their focus lay, un-
derstandably so, on industrial production as the dominant form of value creation and organizing 
socioeconomic principle. Nonetheless they poured the base on which financialization research later 
on unfolded.    
 
Dating back to the debates in Marxist political economy of the outgoing 1970s, the first wave of 
financialization research has its roots in discussions about the absorption of surplus value by the 
financial sector during a time of stagflation and declining rates of profit (Lapavitsas 2013). Later 
on, in the early 1990s a second wave was popularized by Giovanni Arrighi’s book on The Long 
Twentieth Century, in which he re-evaluated the longue durée of capitalist evolution and was probably 
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the first one to use the very term “financialization” (Arrighi 1994: ix). A third group of scholars 
using financialization have been exponents of the French Théorie de la Régulation, whose focus is on 
identifying different growth regimes and phases of capitalist stability via intertemporal comparison. 
In the beginning of the new Millennium, one of the most important representative of the regulation 
school, Robert Boyer (2000), asked, “is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Ford-
ism?” Already before the recent global financial crisis, heterodox economists such as Gerald Ep-
stein and sociologist Greta Krippner elaborated on “financialization and the world economy” (Ep-
stein 2005a) and “the financialization of the American economy” (Krippner 2005) respectively. 
Notwithstanding these the pivotal role of these influential pieces, they were, by and large, excep-
tions. As figure 1 illustrates this changed dramatically with the events following 2007-2008. Based 
on a simple “Web of Science” search on the usage of “financialization” since 1990, we can see that 
its popularity began to rise in 2009 and really started to soar within the last five years. 
  
Source: Web of Science (2018) 
 
In the same time, research on financialization also spread throughout different disciplines making 
it now one of the more momentous topics across political science, economics, sociology, geography 
and business studies, as figure 2 nicely shows. This has led to numerous studies delivering profound 
insights. Among them, four broad sub-streams can be identified. The first deals with structural 
changes in the entire economy and usually understands financialization as a new regime of accu-
mulation where finance holds the central spot for the production of profit. A second stream covers 
transformation in corporate governance and thus works with financialization for example as a 
shareholder value orientation by non-financial firms. The third stream concerns the so-called eve-
ryday life of finance like the overuse of credit cards and private investment schemes of households. 
Figure 1: Publications on 'Financialization' per year, Web of Science, Top 15, 1990-2018. 
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Fourth and finally, the financialization of the state, for instance via the intrusion of financial logics 
and actors into public institutions, forms another stream of research (van der Zwan 2014). As more 
detailed discussions can be found in the individual parts of this dissertation thesis, I now conclude 
the introduction by summing up the subsequent chapters and their contributions. 
 
Figure 2: Publications on 'Financialization', Web of Science categories, Top 10, 1990-2018. 
Source: Web of Science (2018) 
 
Although financialization research has provided substantial input that enhances our overall under-
standing of contemporary capitalism and some of its crucial sub-trends, a number of open ques-
tions remains. While it would be unfair to speak of blind spots, as many aspects are mentioned or 
hinted at in relevant contributions, stating that certain puzzle pieces of the financialization picture 
are still somewhat more underdeveloped than others, hits the nail on the head. This dissertation 
addresses three core pieces of this mosaic and strives to advance their theoretical and empirical 
comprehension. Each of the three chapters that follow this introduction, deals with at least one of 
these aspects and seeks to shed light on their relation to and importance for financialization. In the 
remainder of this section I will now present concise overviews of them and elaborate on their 
respective contributions to our state of knowledge as well as persisting limitations that might en-
courage future research. 
 
Concentrating on the nexus between states and financial markets, chapter 1, entitled “Where States 
and Markets meet”, provides one of the first cross-national and longitudinal studies on changes in 
sovereign debt management (SDM). Debt and public finance are fundamental functions of modern 
nation states. In his General Theory of the State (1976), first published in 1900, Georg Jellinek famously 
lists territory, people and authority (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk and Staatsgewalt) as the three defining 
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characteristics of the state. In modern terms, authority does not exclusively refer to military and 
police forces to guarantee law and order. Moreover, an administrative apparatus and a functioning 
bureaucracy are indispensable requirements for governments and governance. Therefore, it be-
comes clear that in order to not only design but also implement policies, states need financial re-
sources. Historically, besides taxation, the issuance of public debt has been a pivotal means of 
financing expenditures for states. On the other hand, depending on the context under which debt 
is issued and accumulated, it might also limit prospective steering and investment capacities. Put 
differently, “debt serves both to enable and to constrain state power” (Dyson 2014: 34). This con-
flicting relationship becomes even more pressing in an era of globalized financial markets and soar-
ing levels of debt, both public and private (Schularick 2014). Two of the main fiscal decisions put 
in place in the course of the “neoliberal revolution” since the 1970s in nearly all developed capitalist 
countries have been a reform in central banking towards almost complete independence, and a 
pronounced approach to budgetary frugality, commonly known as austerity. In general, this has led 
to transformation from the tax state over the debt state to today’s consolidation state (Streeck 2014). As 
a consequence, instead of just blatantly printing money, sovereigns have more and more referred 
to sources of market finance. In fact, even from the perspective of a longue durée, sovereign debt has 
been representing one of the most important financial assets, both qualitatively, with minimal risk-
weight, and quantitatively, as readily available, go-to investment. From these dynamics arises a re-
configuration of the state-market nexus and, concomitantly, a new contradiction between states as 
participants in and regulators of financial markets. 
 
“Despite variations in relative share of financial assets, sovereign creditworthiness 
has continued to have enormous implications for financial markets as a whole. Mar-
kets—and above all supervisors and regulators—expect sovereign debt to serve a 
special function as an anchor of stability and a refuge of security in a world of high 
financial risks. Its capacity to serve this function is problematic. No sovereign is 
completely safe.” (Dyson 2014: 320)  
 
But how has this development of an increasing reliance on market finance unfolded over time? 
Which commonalities and differences exist between countries? And how can we actually capture 
the intrusion of financial actors, logics, practices and motifs into the sphere of public debt? These 
are the questions that chapter 1 addresses. It starts with the wondrous diagnosis that, despite the 
prominence of debt and finance, studies dealing with the institution of sovereign debt management 
have been largely absent to political economic debates. When analyzing topics surrounding public 
budgets, the dominant questions have been about the actual levels of sovereign debt, their under-
lying reasons, and ways to deal with them. In contrast, sovereign debt management is about the 
structural composition of debt and its manipulation. Avoiding to focus on ‘a most like locus of 
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financial market influence’ (Mosley 2004: 183), hast left this important topic up for grabs for econ-
omists and counselors who have produced a pile of econometric and advisory literature (exempla-
rily: Sundararajan et al. 1997). Therefore, “Where States and Markets meet” partially fills this gap as 
it transfers financialization to the area of public finance. Florian Fastenrath and Christine Tram-
pusch, I have developed a two-dimensional concept to measure the financialization of sovereign 
debt management, consisting of the predominance of financial markets as governance mechanism 
and the adoption of a sense-making framework grounded in financial economics. We argue that in 
doing so were are able to distinguish contemporary (financialized) debt management from its non-
financialized predecessor, for which hierarchical or network governance as well as a macroeco-
nomic view sovereign debt had been characteristic. Applying a set of nine indicators to our com-
prehensive empirical material, we find an impressive trend of financialization, which has unfolded 
over time in all countries covered by our analysis. This rearranged state-market relationship poses 
serious questions about stability, regulatory capture and autonomous policy-making. Yet, one 
mustn’t forget that this process is by no means one-sided. As a number of studies has shown, many 
decisions such as the liberalization of financial markets, the establishment and support of financial 
centers or the explicit avoidance to tighten regulations, were not only deeply political but very often 
voluntarily taken and imposed, because of expected beneficial side effects (Helleiner 1995; 
Krippner 2011). While reforms in sovereign debt management that accommodate financial markets 
might result from domestic power struggles, as it was the case in Germany (Trampusch 2015), they 
can also kick-start further financialization processes like the famous ‘Big Bang’ of 1986 (Dutta 
2018). Summing up, chapter 1 a new analytical approach to interrelatedness of states and financial 
markets, offering insights on their mutual interdependence while at the same time opening routes 
for further futures analysis of this crucial sphere. 
 
Like public debt, uneven geographical development has been another persisting feature in the his-
torical evolution of capitalism, which can be found on different scales, above and below the nation 
state as politico-economic entity (Harvey 2006; Smith 2008). On the one hand, on long tradition 
in economic geography and political economy has dealt with differences in regional production 
regimes, mostly concentrating on Fordism, manufacturing and flexibility (Crouch, Schröder and 
Voelzkow 2009; Matthews 1996). On the other hand, an equally prominent line of research stresses 
the centrifugal effects of liberalization policies and incentivized inter-regional competition for cap-
ital and labor on territorial cohesion (Agnew 2001; MacLeod 2001). However, when concentrating 
on polarization, financialization research so far largely tends to focus on income and wealth, irre-
spective of geographical dimensions. In this regard, a growing strand of literature deals with the 
consequences of a growing exposure to finance for the bargaining power of employees and the 
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negative effects on the functional income distribution in the economy (Alvarez 2015; Lin and To-
maskovic-Devey 2013; Stockhammer 2013). In reaction to this, households often have to turn to 
financial markets to maintain consumption and there reinforce the very same dynamics which have 
made them perform this turn in first place. Although there are some studies which adopt a macro-
economic stance and deal with variations in financialization on the economy-wide level across 
countries (Lapavitsas and Powell 2013), they usually focus on relatively few selected countries and 
completely leave out the sub-national dimension. In a nutshell, we find bits and pieces of inequality, 
uneven development and varied financialization, but still a handful of important links seems miss-
ing. Situated in this context, chapter 2 of this dissertation seeks to combine the renewed political, 
economic and academic interest in regions as distinct sub-national spaces with a macro-structural 
stance on financialization in Europe. It asks about causal factors driving regional differences in 
financialization and thus “Which Roads lead to Wall Street?” Taking into account several standard 
financial market and political-administrative variables, I strive to go further and make the case that, 
in order to really understand what causes finance to be more present in one region than another, 
we have to look at various forms of debt. In that sense, I pick up the comparative view on the 
finance-debt relation, which also ran as a thread through the previous chapter. However, I make 
two important changes. First, I scale down from the level of nation states to the level of regions. 
Second, I flip the causal chain in a sense that I do not ask how financialization is mirrored in debt 
(management), but which effect debt has on financialization. Despite the sometimes patchy nature 
of regional data, especially when it comes to finance, and the accruing methodological limitations, 
chapter 2 offers several interesting results, descriptively and analytically alike. One is that there is a 
huge heterogeneity in the universe of highly financialized regions. Operationalized as shares of 
finance and insurance in regional GDP, we find that next to traditional financial centers, former 
industrial hubs, regions with huge rentier income and such that are rural and lagging behind all can 
be equally high financialized. Second, it seems that specifically household debt plays a central role 
in driving financialization. Both findings inform us about the potential which future research on 
this topic could bear. A fascinating puzzle continues to be the black box of inter-regional credit 
provision. Also, one might ask whether global finance, which effectively wishes to defy national 
boundaries, can be adequately by sub-national frames. Yet, promising hint for in-depth case studies 
might lie in the connection between different reasons for rising household debt and regional or 
even local financial actors like banks. 
 
Leaving behind the former while keeping track of the latter is chapter 3, the final one of this dis-
sertation. Applying a two-dimensional concept which is strongly informed by that of the initial 
chapter, the concluding part analyzes the financialization of German savings banks and critically 
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asks in which way they are “leading by example.” This undertaking is of manifold merit for better 
acknowledging the role of regional financial actors in an era of financialization. First, the chapter 
synthesizes the original concept of market-based banking (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield and Verdun 
2013), which itself offered a groundbreaking view on how financial systems have changed, with 
insights from business studies and sociology that deal with specific aspects of a financial logic 
(Fligstein, Brundage and Schultz 2017; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Froud, Tischer and Williams 
2017). In this way, it allows for an analysis of single banks and presents a more fine-grained view 
on changes in finance that complements the system-wide perspective. Second, putting the focus 
on savings banks and connecting them to the process of financialization breaks up the dichoto-
mous discussion between pundits who suggest that an intensification of global finance can be cap-
tured by looking on large private and investments banks only, and those who regard alternative 
banking as solely defensive financial institutions. Moreover, it helps to generally deepen our com-
prehension of special banks, a stream of literature which has recently gained momentum (Braun 
2018; Trampusch, Linden and Schwan 2014; Mertens and Thiemann 2017; Semenyshyn 2017). 
Third, its adds a further perspective on the political economy of regions in general and the German 
Länder in particular, longtime idle field (Deeg 1999). Fourth and finally, directing the limelight on 
savings banks as pillars of the German system, might also help us to identify transformations in 
national political economies more broadly. Presenting a structured, focused comparison of two 
diverse cases, the Sparkasse KölnBonn and the Stadtsparkasse Bad Honnef over a thiry-year period from 
1986-2016, chapter 3 utilizes a rich variety of primary source data, including several expert inter-
views, to illustrate and discuss a trend of differentiated financialization. While German savings banks 
are still not solely for-profit institutions under public law with an immense tradition in relationship 
and community banking, financialization has not remained them unaffected. The increasing im-
portance of fee income, a rising activity in proprietary trading, notable downsizing and outsourcing 
efforts or processes of internationalization and brand building, indicate fundamental shifts in how 
they conduct their business.  
 
Of course, there are also clear limitations to this study. Most importantly, the question of general-
izability can be brought up immediately. Yet, exemplary in-depth descriptions which foster an an-
alytical concept can portend to central developments that might be worth paying attention to. Also, 
this can encourage future research on the causal mechanisms behind this overarching financializa-
tion process which clearly does not halt at the doorsteps of local public financial institutions. Were 
savings banks willingly accepting all this or were they victims of a rapidly changing context they 
could not influence? This spills over to other parts and results of the dissertation as well. Did 
governments adopt new financial techniques in sovereign debt management on their own and out 
 
 13 
of sheer necessity or has there been substantial lobbying and the structural power of finance at 
work? Does debt foster financialization or is it the other way round? Reverse causality is always 
tricky and tempting. Probably both sides bear some truth as socioeconomic change is never mono-
causal and rarely, if ever, unidirectional. In any case, as a megatrend of capitalism, financialization 
is neither exclusively internal nor external, but reciprocal and recursive. Which direction one 
chooses, depends on the concrete questions one wishes to answer and the research design that 
comes along with it.    
 
 
Notes 
For the sake of uniformity, the entire document follows American English (US) grammar rules, 
albeit punctuation and orthography might differ in the original publications due to respective jour-
nal guidelines. Citations, annotations and reference lists, however, may vary in style and format.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Where States and Markets Meet  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Financial markets play an indispensable role in the management of sovereign debt, that is, the 
mechanics of how and from whom governments borrow. This paper suggests a novel, two-dimen-
sional concept to measure the financialization of sovereign debt management (SDM): (1) the reli-
ance on financial markets as a governance mechanism and (2) the adoption of a sense-making 
framework grounded in financial economics. We split this concept into nine indicators and apply 
it to data from 23 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. Our analysis illustrates the predomi-
nant commonalities across countries, but at the same time, country-specific differences. We inter-
pret them as two sides of the same coin in the light of an overarching trend of increasing alignment 
to financial markets. This article is not only one of the first cross-national as well as longitudinal 
studies of the dynamics in SDM; it also reveals that the relationship between finance and govern-
ments in the SDM is by no means one-sided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Co-authored with Florian Fastenrath and Christine Trampusch) 
(Published in New Political Economy (2017), 22:3, 273-293) 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
At the World Bank’s 1989 Government Borrowers’ Forum in Helsinki, representatives of about 30 
countries met officials from Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Salomon Brothers, who were ‘spe-
cially invited to present their prescriptions for advanced debt management’ (Nars 1997: 5). The 
three investment banks had already done much work on the topic. For some years, they had been 
‘fishing for new business by telling their official customers how to move around their existing bor-
rowing sources’ and were even ‘offering their computer packages free in the hope of winning the 
business, such as swaps, that they generate’ (The Economist 1988: 117–18). In the end, they obvi-
ously made a big catch; since in the mid-1990s, most sovereign bodies were already using financial 
market techniques and instruments for managing their continuously rising levels of public debt. 
 
Now, numerous examples from around the globe illustrate the potential consequences of this de-
velopment. Several governments in Europe, for instance, used derivatives such as interest rate 
swaps for window-dressing purposes to hide their official debt levels. In the wake of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Italy and Greece were the most prominent offenders (Piga 
2001a, 2001b, Dunbar 2003, Lagna 2016). Another problem when using derivatives is the risk of 
recording financially harmful losses. This happened, for example, in Australia, where the govern-
ment was subsequently accused of ‘losing billions of […] taxpayer dollars through “gambling”’ 
(Yusuf and Batten 2009: 295) and Belgium, with losses amounting to 44.3 billion francs (van 
Gerwen and Cassimon 2000).1 Episodes like these demonstrate ‘the entrance of financial markets 
in the management of public debt, extending financial logic to the public sphere’ (Marazzi 2011: 
120), which is a relevant but still underexplored subject (Munoz Martinez 2016). 
 
Scholars of international and comparative political economy regularly investigate the relationship 
between financial markets and governments. They often analyse phenomena like deregulation, 
globalization, financialization of the economy, soaring public debt levels, financial repression and 
crises (e.g. Helleiner 1994, Cohen 1996, Epstein 2005a, Krippner 2011, Boyer 2013, Hardie et al. 
2013, van Riet 2013, Dyson 2014, Streeck 2014, Reinhart and Sbranica 2015, Rommerskirchen 
2015). Contributions then focus either on the ways in which the explosive growth of global financial 
markets constrains governments (Cerny 1994, Strange 1996, Streeck 2014) or on how public au-
thorities have essentially facilitated the re-emergence of these markets (Helleiner 1994, 1995, 
Krippner 2011). Our paper, in contrast, illuminates the state–market nexus in the sovereign bond 
market, ‘a most likely locus of financial market influence’ (Mosley 2004: 183) on government poli-
cies. We do so by examining sovereign debt management (SDM), a phenomenon to which so far 
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‘political scientists have paid scant attention’ (Mosley 2015: 158). Understood as the mechanics of 
how and from whom governments borrow money, SDM is not concerned with the actual level of 
debt, but with the manipulation of its structural composition.2 This includes both the use of various 
debt instruments and the techniques of selling them to financial investors. By analysing changes 
associated with SDM, this article provides a clearer understanding of the state–market nexus in the 
age of global financial markets. We conceptualise this as part of a larger process to which there 
have been rather few political economic contributions so far: the financialization of the state (Wang 
2015, Lagna 2016). 
 
How did SDM change over the last few decades? Is there a uniform development across countries 
or do they substantially differ? These are the puzzles which this paper addresses. As one of the first 
cross-national as well as longitudinal studies of this topic (cf. Abbas et al. 2014), our objective is 
foremost conceptual and descriptive. Following Caramani (2010: 43), we assume that empirical, 
descriptive analysis plays a major role in comparative politics, as it ‘allows us to get dependent 
variables right’ and ‘to discover phenomena’ (italics in original). We characterise the outcome, sug-
gest a concept including indicators and provide data on a phenomenon which the discipline has 
not sufficiently identified and captured yet. Future studies on the causes and effects of the finan-
cialization of SDM might draw on our work. 
 
Our study of 23 selected OECD countries from 1980 to 20103 reveals a fundamental transformation 
in the ways governments manage their debt. Following Epstein’s (2005a: 3) notion of financializa-
tion as ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions’, we extend this framework to SDM. In contrast to other concepts such as ‘marketiza-
tion’, we argue that referring to ‘financialization’ best suits the analysis of the changes in SDM that 
we uncover. However, to be analytically clearer and more precise, our concept of financialization 
of SDM includes two dimensions: (1) the reliance on the market as a governance mechanism and 
(2) the adoption of a sense-making framework grounded in financial economics. As we will justify 
in more detail, narrowing Epstein’s broad definition equips us to analyse the financialization of 
SDM effectively. 
 
The main finding of our study is that the process of financialization of SDM is characterised by 
overarching commonalities accompanied by country-specific differences in both dimensions. Alt-
hough the process fundamentally affects all countries, national specificities continue to exist. Fi-
nancialised forms of SDM may take different shapes according to country-specific contexts. Draw-
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ing on Streeck (2012: 22), this ‘highlights the commonalities of [capitalism and] its varying institu-
tional embodiments, or more precisely: the common dynamics that are responsible for the parallel 
trajectories on which national capitalisms historically move’. 
 
In order to further clarify and underpin our argument this article proceeds as follows: the next 
section elaborates our understanding of a financialization of SDM in more detail and illustrates how 
far it differs from its former non-financialised form. We view SDM as economic activity, because 
it comprises decisions on how and from whom governments borrow money to finance their budget 
deficits. Hence, we analyse its past and present forms along two dimensions: the governance mech-
anisms used to coordinate this economic activity between different actors (Hollingsworth and Lind-
berg 1985, Mayntz 2001) and the underlying intellectual frameworks of economic ideas, which en-
able sense-making and legitimization (Weick 1995, Weick et al. 2005, Fligstein et al. 2014). We split 
these two dimensions into a set of nine indicators4 for our analysis in sections three and four. Fi-
nally, section five points to the contribution of this article to the analysis of the financialization of 
the state and the state–market nexus. We conclude that financialization is a continuing process 
affecting crucial state areas. Moreover, financial markets effectively define but do not determine 
courses of action for SDM. 
 
 
1.2 The financialization of SDM: a two-dimensional concept 
 
Before we reveal our concept for measuring the change in SDM and argue why it is useful to 
transfer the term financialization to this area, we want to emphasise that all governments in our 
sample have been facing ever-higher debt levels. Figure 1 shows that since the 1980s, there has 
been an overall trend towards rising indebtedness in our 23 OECD countries. In 30 years, the debt-
to-GDP ratio more than doubled from less than 30 to almost 75 per cent. While this alone is not 
new news, Figure 1 also reports that the share of marketable debt (MD)5 grew even more strongly. 
With the exception of a few rather short periods, most notably in the late 1990s, MD has constantly 
risen in relation to non-marketable liabilities. As a result, its share in total government debt in-
creased from about 70 per cent in 1980 to more than 90 per cent in 2010. Consequently, this figure 
confirms that political science should not only scrutinise the levels or change rates of public debt, 
but also show how far governments use market-based modes of refinancing and the related finan-
cial markets transactions of debt managers. 
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When social scientists analyse current trends in the dynamics of financial markets and debt, they 
very often refer to the term ‘financialization’ (van der Zwan 2014). Dealing with this rise of finance, 
most contributions are in line with Epstein’s (2005b) previously mentioned concept and centre on 
three subfields: the economy (e.g. Krippner 2005, 2011), corporations (e.g. Fligstein 1990, Froud 
et al. 2006) and the everyday life of households (e.g. Langley 2008, Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). 
Surprisingly, with few exceptions (Wang 2015, Lagna 2016), explicit analyses of the financialization 
of the state are still missing (Davis 2009: 177–87, van der Zwan 2014: fn. 13). 
Sources: own calculations using OECD (2015) and other primary sources (see supplementary file).  
Notes: data for all countries from 1980–2010 except CAN, IRL, ESP (1981–2010), FIN, LUX (1990–2010), FRA, NZL 
(1992–2010), NOR (1982–2010), CH (1986–2010) and UK (1998–2010). Although the picture becomes obscured 
with Japan out of the equation, the overall trend still holds. While the other countries reduced their debt-to-GDP 
ratios from 1996–2001 and even in the past relied on MD more strongly, Japan caught up with respect to the latter 
from 2000–3. 
 
Of course, scholars acknowledge that there is a close relationship between financialization in gen-
eral and the role of governments in expanding their markets for sovereign debt (e.g. Mosley 2003, 
Quinn 2010, Hardie 2012,6 Pacewicz 2013, Streeck 2014). Illustrative episodes are the ongoing Eu-
rozone crises or the Basel II agreement of 1992, which more or less squeezed banks into buying 
zero-risk weighted sovereign bonds. Nevertheless, how governments become actively engaged in 
private sector style financial market practices to manage their debt is usually left aside (Mosley 2010: 
29). In addition, the political science literature on SDM and related topics is still in its infancy 
(exceptions are Datz 2008, Gabor 2012, Dyson 2014, Trampusch 2015, 2016, Lagna 2016, Livne 
and Yonay 2016, Munoz Martinez 2016). 
Figure 2: Total central government debt (continuous line) and total marketable debt (dotted line) as a % of GDP 
(left). Annual growth of marketable debt as a share of total central government debt (bars) in percentage points 
(right). OECD 23: bold, OECD 22 excluding JAP: light.  
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This paper contributes to filling these gaps in three ways. First, we extend the concept of financial-
ization by applying it to the practices involved in SDM. Second, we suggest that the process of 
financialization of SDM is reflected in an increasing reliance on financial markets as governance 
mechanisms and the adoption of a sense-making framework grounded in financial economics. 
Third, we complement existing analysis by adding a longitudinal and cross-national perspective. 
Thus, we provide new data and a conceptual application to the debate on financialization. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of financialized and non-financialized SDM. 
Characteristics Non-financialised SDM Financialised SDM 
 
Governance  
mechanism 
Non-market (hierarchical, network) 
 Interest rates on bonds were politically con-
trolled and determined; captive sources of fi-
nancing; debt monetization 
 Financing decisions based on short-term expedi-
ency within a highly regulated domestic environ-
ment 
 Predominantly loans and long-term relationship  
financing 
   Financial market (competitive) 
 Predominantly marketable debt instruments 
sold to privileged primary dealers  
(Indicators: MD, PDS) 
 Interest rates on bonds are market-determined 
by auctions, thus subject to supply and demand  
 (Indicator: Auctions) 
 Sovereign refinancing as a tool to develop fi-
nancial markets and broaden the investor base 
in a globally deregulated and competitive envi-
ronment (Indicators: MDNR, MDFC, ILBs) 
Sense-making 
framework 
  Macroeconomics → passive administration 
 Operational responsibility in the hands of cen-
tral banks and civil servants inside Departments 
of Finance or Treasuries 
 Limited toolkit of instruments at use 
 Traditional public sector form of cash-based ac-
counting 
      Financial economics → active management 
 Operational responsibility in the hands of spe-
cific and separate agencies (DMOs). (Indicator: 
DMOs) 
 Use of complex financial innovations like de-
rivatives, which allow for separating issuance 
from portfolio decisions. (Indicator: Swaps) 
 Modern private sector form of accruals ac-
counting. (Indicator: Accruals Accounting) 
Source: own compilation based on the literature quoted in the main text. 
 
The reason for bringing these extensions into the literature on financialization becomes clear when 
one inspects the main trends of SDM over the last few decades. Economic and advisory literature 
on SDM shows that between the 1970s and 1990s, SDM has fundamentally changed in major 
OECD countries (Carracedo and Dattels 1997: 100–5, Nars 1997, Magnusson 1999, Blommestein 
2002, Wheeler 2004, Wolswijk and de Haan 2005: 6–8, Storkey 2006, Andabaka Badurina and 
Svaljek 2012: 77). Table 1 displays the main characteristics of past and present SDM. While the 
former can be described as non-financialised since it was less dependent on financial markets, their 
actors and logics, the latter clearly features many aspects of a growing alignment of SDM practices 
with financial markets. For better analytical understanding and conceptual clarity, we suggest dis-
cussing both forms of SDM according to the predominantly adopted governance mechanisms and 
the respective underlying sense-making frameworks, a point that will we now develop in detail. 
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Following the common conception of governance in the comparative political economy literature, 
economic activities can be coordinated through various governance mechanisms: state or firm hi-
erarchies, networks, associations or market transactions (Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985, Hol-
lingsworth and Boyer 1997, Mayntz 2001, Lütz 2003). In the past, two of them mainly played an 
important role in SDM. On the one hand, hierarchical governance describes non-financialised 
SDM best, since non-market, state-centred coordination was its crucial feature. Highly controlled 
sovereign bond markets, with investors ‘captured’ by investment regulations, formed the (mostly) 
domestic environment in which financing decisions were based on short-term expediency. Another 
significant aspect of this was the use of debt monetization (inflation) for deficit financing until the 
1970s. 
 
On the other hand, there were also certain aspects of networks, because bank loans and longterm-
oriented relationship financing were dominant features of SDM (Panizza et al. 2009: 655–6, Abbas 
et al. 2014). Thus, sovereign borrowers accessed capital markets with the help of banks, which 
functioned as their underwriters and whose reputation and ‘brand’ granted ‘market access on fa-
vourable terms’ (Flandreau and Flores 2009: 647). 
 
In contrast, when describing present, financialised SDM, it is indispensable to speak of competitive 
(financial) market-based forms of governance. They take place in a globally deregulated environ-
ment and largely follow the logic of supply and demand. While in the past interest rates on bonds 
were politically determined, they are now subject to market fluctuations because debt instruments 
are issued at auctions with competitive bidding.7 Furthermore, the role of MD has been strength-
ened to deepen and widen financial markets. In order to measure this change towards financial 
marketbased governance of SDM, we use the following six indicators: the share of MD, marketable 
debt held by non-residents (MDNR) and marketable debt in foreign currency (MDFC), as well as 
the introduction of auctions, primary dealer systems (PDSs) and index-linked bonds (ILBs). 
 
The second analytical dimension is about divergent underlying sense-making frameworks of SDM. 
Before developing this at length, we would like to emphasise why it seems crucial to us to include 
it in our concept. As Livne and Yonay (2016), for example, have elaborated for the Israeli case 
(GDMU), specific economic ideas and mathematical models based on these ideas effectively pre-
shape discussions about debt management decisions. This is part of the larger argument about the 
influence of economists on policy-making in general (Hall 1989, Fourcade 2006, 2009) and financial 
ideas in particular (Blyth 2003). Referring to Karl Weick’s (1995) insights from organisational soci-
ology and psychology when analysing decisions of the US Fed, Fligstein et al. (2014: 9–18) note 
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that it is crucial to reflect different ways of sense-making. This means that within (economic or 
financial) organisations, evaluating different courses of action, and ultimately taking a decision, is 
always structured by pre-existing frameworks that represent a specific view of how the economy 
works (Fligstein et al. 2014: 11). Therefore, sense-making frameworks and governance mechanisms 
are interwoven (Weber and Glynn 2006). Relating this to our case, we argue that non-financialised 
SDM relied on the intellectual foundation of classic macroeconomics (Pecchi and Piga 1995, Gio-
vannini 1997: 44). Starting in the 1960s, SDM included macroeconomic goals and was a tool for 
stabilising the economy. This clearly distinguished it from private sector debt management 
(Wolswijk and de Haan 2005: 6–8). Debt management was viewed as an ‘extension of monetary 
policy’ (Currie et al. 2003: 11), which implies that macroeconomists inter alia ‘assigned debt man-
agement the important role of stabilizing aggregate demand’ (Pecchi and Piga 1995: 30). This be-
comes clearer when one takes into account the fact that in the past, operational responsibility for 
SDM was in the hands of central bankers and civil servants inside treasuries or ministries of finance. 
Administrative tasks were performed with a limited toolkit of debt instruments at hand, while bu-
reaucrats at the same time used traditional public forms of cash-based accounting. Next to the 
emphasis on the macroeconomic impact of borrowing decisions, debt managers acted rather pas-
sively, since SDM was restricted to ‘keeping books and records on borrowing transactions and the 
repayment of debt’ (Andabaka Badurina and Svaljek 2012: 76). 
 
In contrast, financialised SDM takes monetary policy as given (Abbas et al. 2014: 4, fn. 3) and is 
informed by financial economics as its intellectual foundation (Nars 1997). The fact that sovereigns 
have started to make sense of their debt as a ‘portfolio’ instead of focusing on individual loans 
(Caplen 1995) mirrors the crucial shift in the underlying frameworks towards financial economics. 
This perspective implies that debt managers are focusing on optimisation calculations based on 
cost–risk trade-offs. Standard portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952) provides instructions for the best 
possible combination of investment alternatives in order to optimise the investor’s portfolio. An 
optimal portfolio minimises risks while maintaining or increasing the expected return. This main 
tenet of portfolio theory has been adopted by state executives (Abbas et al. 2014: 4) – only in 
reverse. They now aim at minimising debt service costs resulting from a portfolio of liabilities, just 
as a private ‘asset manager would seek to add return to his portfolio’ (Lee 1996). Hence, a greater 
significance and consideration of risks in the daily debt management operations has accompanied 
the shift in frameworks (Magnusson 1999, OECD 2005, Holler 2013). While conducting our re-
search, we have found numerous instances of evidence justifying sense-making as a conceptual 
dimension. A notable example is the former CEO of the German Finanzagentur, who explicitly 
speaks of the importance of Markowitz’ (1952) portfolio theory and its modern versions for day-
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to-day debt management practices (Daube 2009). Thus, in general, we regard this change in sense-
making frameworks as a fundamental ‘shift in thinking (…) which redefined debt management in 
important ways’ (Currie et al. 2003: 15). 
 
This implies, first, that nowadays, in most OECD countries, SDM is the operational responsibility 
of special debt management offices (DMOs), which primarily employ well-paid professional port-
folio managers coming from private investment banks (e.g. Currie et al. 2003). Because DMOs 
compete with private financial institutions in hiring these experts, they also reformed their salary 
scales. On the one hand, these personnel are recruited based on experience in private financial 
sector firms but also with regard to their skills in risk and portfolio management, including the 
corresponding mathematical models such as Monte Carlo simulations. The German Finanzagentur 
(2002), for instance, has set up a team of trained financial economists, mathematicians and physi-
cists to execute portfolio management and financial engineering.8 On the other hand, the newly 
hired staff also contributes to the establishment of a specific culture. For the UK for example, 
Davies (2005: 234), at that time senior official at the UK DMO, notes that ‘the most important 
aspect is that a strong risk management culture pervades the organization at all levels’. This per-
ception of risk is typically associated with classic portfolio theory. To detect the risk structure in-
scribed in the debt portfolio, the introduction of accruals accounting brings a market-based view 
to public balance sheets (Newberry 2015). Accounting, including its various historical forms, is a 
generally important aspect of sense-making, since it functions as a ‘cognitive device’ (Carruthers 
and Espeland 1991: 55). Moreover, Quinn (2016: 7) even regards it as one of the ‘building blocks 
of understanding’. Speaking of financial economics, the application of portfolio theory to debt 
management then advises debt managers to diversify risks by issuing various types of securities and 
using mathematics in financial risk management. As a result, each country now possesses its own 
characteristic debt portfolio, put together and constantly manipulated in the light of the cost–risk 
trade-off. In other words, ‘debt managers have increasingly become risk managers as well’ (Bröker 
1993: 12). This allows them to play with interest rates and currency rate risks. They do so by using 
various forms of derivatives. In this regard, together with the aforementioned introduction of ac-
cruals accounting, ‘sense-making frameworks (…) reflect beliefs about what is, and beliefs about 
what ought to be’ (Starbuck and Milliken 1988: 51). Formerly, stricter international capital controls 
and less developed financial instruments had blocked this option. We operationalise the shift to 
financial economics in the sense-making framework with the following three indicators: the use of 
derivatives, the introduction of accruals accounting and the establishment of professional DMOs. 
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After having synthesised the main features of financialised SDM, the following two sections pre-
sent our empirical analysis. Therefore, we start with the governance mechanisms before dealing 
with the sense-making frameworks. By connecting our indicators to the empirical material, we 
highlight the commonalities of financialization while also pointing to country-specific trajectories 
as differences within this trend. We rely on metric and non-metric (timing) data provided by inter-
national organisations like the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as academic research 
on this topic.9 Although conceptual considerations guide our choice of indicators, the scarcity of 
useful cross-national data at the same time constrains it. 
 
 
1.3 Governance mechanisms of SDM: from states to financial markets 
 
The first six indicators that we present refer to the governance of SDM. Regarding the timing of 
reforms, we analyse the years of introduction of auctions, PDSs and ILBs. Concerning metrics, we 
look at MD in general, as well as the share held by non-residents (MDNR) and issued in foreign 
currencies (MDFC). 
 
Figure 2 depicts the share of marketable debt (MD). Its volume measures the degree to which debt 
managers are able ‘to maintain the marketability of the government’s debt instruments [which …] 
thereby ensures continued and broader access to financial markets’ (OECD 1982: 12). It also sug-
gests that liquid secondary markets, on which bonds are sold and traded,10 are increasingly signifi-
cant. Therefore, the share of MD is a proxy for the level of securitisation of sovereign debt. Fur-
thermore, ‘to the extent financial markets are seen to have a comparative advantage in diversifying 
risk, the cost–risk trade-off also implies that sovereign debt managers will typically prefer to issue 
marketable debt’ (Abbas et al. 2014: 4). Thus, the higher the share of MD, the more debt managers 
use the market mechanism to borrow and the more financialised the SDM becomes. The numbers 
in Figure 2 reveal a clear increase in the MD share across our sample of 23 OECD countries. First, 
after a brief initial decline in the very beginning, the median rose by more than one-third from 65 
per cent to 90 per cent in the period 1981–2010. Second, as the scatter plot shows, this trend has 
even affected countries that were initially reluctant to issue MD. Whereas in the early 1980s, Den-
mark, the USA or Austria already relied (almost) exclusively on MD, countries like Germany and 
Spain were at the bottom of the distribution list with values of 33 and 16 per cent. However, from 
the late 1990s, both have been constantly recording averages above 94 and 91 per cent. Despite 
supporting our claim of substituting hierarchies and networks with (financial) markets as govern-
ance mechanism, data on the share of MD also present some evidence for the unequal manner of 
this process. Since there are still differences in the degree to which debt managers use MD, as the 
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examples of Norway (63 per cent in 2005) or Luxembourg (76 per cent in 2010) show, we can argue 
that this aspect of financialization unfolds on country-specific trajectories. Our next two indicators 
of the governance dimension of the financialization of SDM build on what we have argued so far. 
By seizing the opportunity of appealing to non-resident buyers, debt managers can take part in 
international capital markets. The share of marketable debt held by non-residents (MDNR) covers 
exactly that and represents a tendency which has gained further momentum in some countries after 
the effective abolition of exchange rate risks by the EMU (Wolswijk and de Haan 2005: 17–18). 
Consequently, a higher proportion of MDNR signals a shift towards a financial market governance 
mechanism in SDM. 
 
Figure 3: Marketable debt in % total outstanding central government debt, 1980–2010. 
Sources: own calculations according OECD (2015) and other primary sources (see supplementary file). Black line: 
median. Note: Data for all countries from 1980–2010 except CAN, IRL, ESP (1981–2010), FIN, LUX (1990–2010), 
FRA, NZL (1992–2010), NOR (1982–2010), CH (1986–2010) and UK (1998–2010). 
 
 
Turning to our data, Figure 3 clearly displays an increasing trend throughout almost all our coun-
tries. In the 30 years that we cover, the median value has quadrupled, reaching 45 per cent in 2010. 
In the early 1980s, Iceland was the only country with more non-resident than resident debt. At the 
end of the period, however, Finland, France and Austria lead our sample. Many countries now issue 
nearly half of their liabilities to non-residential investors; Portugal is a prime example connecting 
this to financialization (Rodrigues et al. 2016: 15–18). With a share of about 20 per cent MDNR, 
Canada and Norway lie at the other end of the spectrum. There are also countries which almost 
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exclusively issue debt domestically. An example is Luxembourg, the only reporting country with 
zero per cent MDNR throughout. Japan also falls in this category. Because of its model of domestic 
pension fund capitalism with large institutional investors (Tokuoka 2010, Andritzky 2012), Japanese 
debt managers do not need to turn to international capital markets or do so very carefully, taking a 
share of about only five per cent.11 Finally, there are also countries which have actually reduced their 
share of MDNR (e.g. New Zealand from 53 per cent in 1995 to36 per cent in 2010). Overall, this 
confirms our claim that financialised SDM is common to developed capitalist economies, while at 
the same time unfolding unequally and on country-specific trajectories. 
 
Figure 4: Marketable debt held by non-residents in % of total central government debt, 1980–2010. 
Sources: own calculation based on OECD (2015) and other primary sources (see supplementary file). Black line: 
median. Notes: Data for all countries from 1980–2010, except: CAN (1981–2010), FIN (1990–2010), FRA (1987–
2010), IRE (1995–2010), ITA (1988–2010), NED (1985–2001), NZL (1992–2010), NOR (1989–2010), SWE (1995–
2010) and UK (1996–2010). No data for: AUS, BEL, GER, GRE, JAP and CH. 
 
Marketable debt issued in a foreign currency (MDFC) can be another tool to attract a broader range 
of investors. In the past, this instrument especially enabled countries with limited domestic capital 
markets and minor currencies, like Ireland or the Scandinavian economies, to attract international 
investors. Whereas countries with leading currencies like the USA, Switzerland, Germany or the 
UK either refrained completely from MDFC or started using it relatively recently (Carracedo and 
Dattels 1997: 112). We would like to stress that foreign currency and non-resident debt are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive in all cases. There is, for example, also the possibility of issuing do-
mestic currency debt to non-residential investors as well as having resident creditors buy foreign 
currency debt. The main line of division here runs along the size of the economy. The OECD 
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(2012a: 5), for instance, notes that ‘for the larger OECD countries, foreign currency issuance does 
not appear crucial for attracting non-resident financial investors (…)’. On the other hand, even 
Germany now issues a Dollar-Bund as a reaction to investor demands and this provides a wider 
choice of instruments (Finanzagentur 2005). The scatter plot in Figure 4 displays the share of 
MDFC over time and shows a decline in country-specific differences. At its peak in 1985, the 
median MDFC value was about 11 per cent, whereas nowadays it is close to zero. As illustrated 
below, prime examples of this fall in MDFC are Portugal, Finland and Ireland. However, not all 
countries have reduced their share equally: marketable foreign currency debt still makes up 20 per 
cent in Denmark and Sweden. With Germany and the Netherlands going against the tide, there are 
even some contemporary ‘outliers’. Both countries have started issuing MDFC quite recently, alt-
hough still at very low levels of three and one per cent. 
 
Two major causal factors have seemingly fuelled this development: first, a steep decline in MDFC 
occurred in the wake of the EMU. The introduction of the euro as a common currency has funda-
mentally reduced national exchange rate risks while simultaneously widening the investor base 
(Favero et al. 2000: 4). At the same time, the euro itself has contributed to further financialization 
in general (Rossi 2013). Second, an increase in the use of derivative financial instruments not only 
gave sovereign debt managers the potential to hedge existing risks, but also made MDFC numbers 
disappear from the balance sheets. We will come back to this again in more detail when discussing 
the use of derivatives. In sum, our findings overall reflect a development of MDFC in the direction 
of financialised SDM. While these factors, which seemingly account for general decline of foreign 
currency debt at first sight – the EMU and the use of swaps – both express financialization on their 
own, cross-national variation in MDFC signifies country-specific trajectories embedded in a general 
trend towards a financialised SDM as a commonality.  
 
Three other important indicators which measure the change in the governance mechanism towards 
a financialised SDM are the introduction of auctions, PDSs and ILBs. For these indicators, we were 
able to collect the years of their introduction. The first two measure in more detail the institution-
alisation of primary and secondary markets, and hence the shift from relationship financing to 
market-based techniques in the issuance of debt instruments (World Bank and IMF 2001, Anda-
baka Badurina and Svaljek 2012: 76).12 Auctions mean that prices of government securities are de-
termined through arm’s length, competitive bidding by (international) investors. 
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Sources: own calculation based on OECD (2015) and other primary sources (see supplementary file). Black line: 
median. Notes: Data for all countries from 1980–2010, except: FIN (1980, 1985, 1989–2010), FRA (1980, 1985, 
1989, 1991–8, 2002–10), GER (1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993–2010), GRE (1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 
2006–10), IRL (1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995–2006), JAP (1980–2009), LUX (1990– 2010), NZL (1992–
2010), NOR (1981–2010), POR (1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2000–10), ESP (1980, 1985, 1989–2010) 
and CH (1986–2010). 
 
According to Bröker (1993: 17), the use of auction techniques is ‘perhaps the most typical indication 
of market governance in public debt management’. Complementarily, the introduction of a PDS 
indicates the establishment of a communication and selling mechanism. It ensures continuous ori-
entation towards investor demands (e.g. Arnone and Iden 2003, AFME 2015) because a fixed num-
ber of global investment banks ‘are appointed by sovereign issuers to buy, promote and distribute 
sovereign bonds’ (AFME 2015: x).13 They are the debt managers’ advisors on issuing matters as 
well as their eyes and ears in the market and are ‘entrusted to distribute debt and promote secondary 
market liquidity’ (Gabor 2012: 6). In return, they have privileged access to government bonds in-
cluding ‘fairly generous selling commissions’ (Kalderen 1997: 86). Another specific aspect of this 
investor orientation – and thus financial market governance – is the introduction of ILBs. This 
indicator captures whether debt managers wish to attract and meet a growing demand from insti-
tutional investors (Lemoine 2013) and broaden their investor base. These instruments usually link 
the interest paid by sovereigns to the domestic inflation rate. Hence, they particularly hedge the 
long-term interests of pension funds or insurance companies. 
 
Figure 5: Marketable debt in foreign currency in % of total central government debt, 1980–2010. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative proportion of adopters, where we record the timing of the in-
troduction of these three indicators. Over time, we see an impressive and clear trend of common-
alities in the financialization of SDM. Whereas in 1980 only five countries were already using auc-
tions with PDS and ILBs almost non-existent, by 2010, the picture has been reversed: 16 countries 
were issuing ILBs, 17 had set up a PDS and all but one made use of auctions. As the progress of 
each curve shows, financialization of SDM unfolds at a steady pace. In the early 1980s, a few ‘in-
novative’ governments paved the way for others to follow. Although the number of countries using 
auctions has changed only little since the early 1990s, the establishment of PDS and the introduc-
tion of ILBs unfolded more gradually over the entire 30-year period. In the end, however, what 
had once been non-financialised SDM with hierarchical and network governance, ultimately trans-
formed into financialised SDM based on financial markets as governance mechanism. 
 
Figure 6: Auctions, primary dealer systems and ILBs as cumulative proportion of adopters, 1980-2010. 
Source: own compilation according to various primary sources (see supplementary file). 
 
As with the previous indicators, it is important to stress that this trend of commonalities does not 
imply a levelling out of differences. For instance, countries still vary to some degree in the specific 
mechanics of how they operate either single-price or multiple-price auctions (Bröker 1993: 97, 
OECD 2012b). At a single-price auction (also uniform-price or Dutch auction), ‘all bonds are sold 
at the same lowest accepted price’, but at a multiple-price auction, ‘bonds are sold at the actual bid 
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price of successful bidders’ (OECD 2012b: 64). Furthermore, differences exist not only in the tim-
ing of the introduction of a PDS, but also in its design. Most significantly, the number of primary 
dealers included and the supervision of a PDS reflect these differences (Arnone and Iden 2003: 22). 
 
Moreover, speaking of country-specific trajectories, this also holds true for the extent to which debt 
managers actually use ILBs. Some countries such as the UK, Sweden, France and the USA have 
increasingly expanded their ILB use over the years. Yet, other countries do not issue ILBs at all, 
either because inflation pressure is low, as in Switzerland, or because debt managers prefer other 
variable-rate instruments like those available in Austria, Belgium and Portugal (Missale 1999: 63–6) 
(see supplementary file Tables 11 and 12). ILBs differ not only in the extent to which they are used, 
but also with regard to their underlying index. In addition to the Consumer Price Index, other 
‘inflation indices (such as wholesale prices, average earnings and the GDP deflator) have been used’ 
(Deacon et al. 2004: 6). Although ILBs are a debt instrument of generally increasing importance, 
there are still noticeable differences underlying country-specific trajectories. 
 
Completing this first part of our empirical analysis, we conclude that there is ample evidence un-
derpinning our argument for a shift from hierarchies and networks towards financial markets as a 
governance mechanism of SDM. In line with our concept, we interpret this as the first aspect of 
the financialization of SDM, shared by all countries in our sample, but with different country-
specific trajectories. In the following, second, empirical section, we now examine the underlying 
sensemaking frameworks. 
 
 
1.4 Sense-making frameworks of SDM: from macroeconomics to financial economics 
 
Our three final indicators – the introduction of accruals accounting, the establishment of DMOs 
and the use of derivatives – grasp the shift from macro- to financial economics sense-making frame-
works of SDM. In this regard, it is especially important to note that since the late 1980s, these 
frameworks, which shape how debt managers view the role of SDM in the economy and thus guide 
their day-today behaviour, have increasingly been grounded in the principles of portfolio theory 
(Bröker 1993, Nars 1997). It follows from this that a financialised SDM narrowly aims at minimising 
long-term borrowing costs at an acceptable level of risk (IMF and World Bank 2001, Hubig and 
Blommestein 2013: 21). In other words, ‘government debt managers increasingly combine cost 
considerations with related risk considerations in the well-known trade-off fashion which has been 
developed by modern portfolio theory’ (Bröker 1993: 40). This refers to the assumption that de-
creasing potential costs go along with increasing risks. In particular, there is a trade-off between 
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reducing either borrowing costs or rollover risk.14 Together, these three indicators describe a fun-
damental change: in a portfolio theory way, debt managers now treat the composition of sovereign 
liabilities as a debt portfolio similar to the asset and liability structure of a finance company. 
 
Thereby, the introduction of accruals accounting captures the attempt to reveal the total cost and 
risk structure inscribed in sovereign debt portfolios. This signals transparency vis-à-vis financial 
investors and helps debt managers to ‘take adequate borrowing and restructuring decisions’ (Bröker 
1993: 154). Thus, the introduction of accruals accounting reflects an important aspect of the shift 
in the sense-making framework towards financial economics: the perceived necessity to adjust the 
data basis and its representation for decision-making. According to Taylor and Crocker (1981, cited 
Starbuck and Milliken 1988: 51), frameworks ‘categorize data, assign likelihoods to data, hide data, 
and fill in missing data’. In contrast to its traditionally administrative cash-based form, accruals 
accounting introduces a market-based view of finance to the public sector that resembles a corpo-
rate balance sheet (Newberry 2015). In an OECD publication, Günther Bröker (1993: 154) high-
lights this similarity and notes that the only remaining difference is that ‘during a particular reporting 
period, a government debt manager would count as “total costs” of the government debt or of 
individual debt instruments what a portfolio manager would count as “total return” on his portfo-
lio’. As Figure 6 depicts, the introduction of accruals accounting marks a relatively new phenome-
non. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s with only a few pioneering countries like Spain 
(1986), New Zealand (1989), USA (1990) or Belgium (1991), it then accelerated at the end of the 
Millennium. Eventually, by the end of our reporting period, 70 per cent of the countries had intro-
duced it. Zooming in on this commonality, one also finds nuanced differences in accruals account-
ing. As the IMF study by Khan and Mayes (2009: 2) shows, some countries execute on ‘full accrual 
basis’ that is in line with international accounting standards (e.g. Australia, Canada or France), while 
others combine cash and accruals accounting (e.g. Finland, Ireland or Sweden). 
 
The degree of SDM financialization also depends very much on the existence of separate DMOs. 
The establishment of DMOs is an important reform. They very often hire investment bankers or 
hedge fund managers. Thus, DMOs reflect another aspect of shifting sense-making frameworks 
towards financial economics. DMOs are responsible for most of the tasks described above and 
generally follow the organisational structure of a private sector financial institution having separate 
front, middle and back offices, each with distinct functions (Hubig 2013: 4, IMF and World Bank 
2014: 21). Performing according to pre-defined benchmarks, they are equipped with financial sector 
personnel and technology. With the establishment of DMOs, since the late 1980s, governments 
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have increasingly replaced passive issuance with portfolio management practices similar to those 
found in the private sector (Currie et al. 2003). 
 
Source: own compilation according to various primary sources (see supplementary file). 
 
An illustrative case is the Swedish DMO. In addition to hiring financial sector staff, the Riksgälden 
even hires external portfolio managers and uses the SimCorp Dimension software package that was 
especially designed for private investment funds and asset managers (Jönsson 2005: 227). It is im-
portant to note that with the application of such computer programmes, the respective forms of 
sense-making based on financial economics are transferred to these public DMOs since the respec-
tive models effectively pre-shape what can be perceived, detected and handled as inherent risk 
(Grimpe 2012). Apart from the USA, which had already introduced a separate public debt entity in 
1940, the forerunners regarding DMOs were Switzerland (1979), New Zealand (1988), Sweden 
(1989), Iceland (1990), Ireland (1990) and Denmark (1991). Another significant wave, during which 
many European countries followed suit, marked the period before the introduction of the euro. 
After that, the curve has remained flat, so that now, 18 of our 23 countries have a DMO (Figure 
6). Although, the introduction of separate DMOs is a common trend in the sample, there exist 
different organisational settings with correspondingly different degrees of independence from po-
litical interference (e.g. Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 1997: 23–36, Currie et al. 2003, Gross and 
Hoshmand 2015, Trampusch 2015, 2016). One can distinguish three different locations for a 
DMO: inside or outside the Ministry of Finance (with New Zealand and the UK for the former 
and Germany and Ireland for the latter) or within the Central Bank (e.g. Denmark). 
Figure 7: Swaps, debt management offices and accruals accounting as cumulative proportion of 
adopters, 1980–2010. 
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Our final aspect of the shift in frameworks of SDM towards financial economics is the use of 
financial derivatives. In contrast to the various debt instruments dealt with in the previous section, 
derivatives are risk management instruments. This becomes clear when one sketches the entire debt 
management process along its timeline. Before using derivatives, the organisational structure (staff, 
software, etc.) has to be set up. Also, the debt portfolio itself has to exist and to be perceived as 
such. This means that both its composition of different instruments (foreign currency, long-term 
or short-term debt, etc.) and the notion of having a portfolio to hand which now has to be risk-
managed must be given. Especially for the latter, the shift in frameworks is crucial. Accordingly, 
we argue that tracking the use of derivatives for debt management allows us to conclude that sense-
making is now based on financial economics. In the case of SDM, derivatives usually encompass 
interest rate and cross-currency swaps. This is of crucial importance because it captures the fine-
grained fundamentals of portfolio theory. Derivatives can be seen as useful tools for achieving two 
goals: lowering borrowing costs and optimising risk structure (Finanzagentur 2002, OECD 2002, 
2011). By using swaps, debt managers seek to ‘reduce the size of liabilities and to increase the value 
of the portfolio’ (Delduque 2000: 12). Inscribed in this very principle, there is always the oppor-
tunity of trying to take advantage of small differences in prices (Medeiros et al. 2007: 3). By doing 
so, debt managers might then turn into traders (Grimpe 2012). 
 
Despite the hedging function of derivatives, one cannot exclude the potentially speculative and 
opportunistic behaviour that goes along with them. The few studies of government swap deals so 
far strikingly indicate their misuse, for example, for window-dressing purposes (Piga 2001a, Irwin 
2012, Lagna 2016). Even international advisers like the IMF view this as a twilight zone and legal 
limbo (Medeiros et al. 2007: 42). Although we have traced the year when governments permitted 
the use of derivatives for SDM, exact numbers for the extent to which debt managers have actually 
used this risk(y) instrument are not accessible, because most sovereigns treat the conditions, con-
tents and results of swaps deals as highly confidential (Piga 2001a, Irwin 2012, Munoz Martinez 
2016). Trailblazers in the use of swaps are Austria (1981), Denmark (1983), Canada (1984), Finland 
(1987), Australia (1988), Belgium (1989) and New Zealand (1989). In the 1990s, most other coun-
tries followed suit and now almost 90 per cent of them have entered derivatives markets (Figure 
6). Thus, we can speak of another crucial commonality in the process of financialization of SDM 
in our sample. However, looking at individual countries or country groups also reveals differences, 
both in the types of swaps they use and the extent to which they do so. The former depends very 
much on a country’s monetary position. Cross-currency swaps are important for countries with 
weak currencies such as New Zealand or Sweden. Before the introduction of the euro, this was also 
true for other Nordic economies, most of the South, Ireland and Belgium (Missale 1999: 57–8, 
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Wheeler 2004: 33). Still, this does not mean that these countries now refrain from using swaps but 
they use them differently, since the euro itself contributed to further financialization, as already 
pointed out. Examples like Finland, where the advent of the euro ‘allowed for an increase in the 
use of derivative instruments’ (Republic of Finland State Treasury 2013: 47), and Ireland, where the 
national debt management agency (NTMA) decided to hedge all foreign currency debt in euros 
from 1999 onwards (NTMA 1993–2011), underline this fact. Differences in the extent of swap use 
mainly depend on existing legal limitations, as a 2002 OECD report has noted for Finland, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, the degree of risk taking is different among countries. More 
aggressive DMOs, like the Swedish Riksgälden or the German Finanzagentur, also use tactical 
swaps, which are supposed to save additional costs in the short to medium term. 
 
Summing up, we argue that countries have become more alike. Despite existing country-specific 
differences, they are all subject to common trends and benchmarks. This, we argue, runs through 
our entire empirical analysis. Whether it is regarding a shift from hierarchies and networks to finan-
cial markets as governance mechanisms, or concerning the substitution of macroeconomics with 
financial economics as underlying sense-making frameworks, financialization is a mega trend af-
fecting all political economies and their SDM. Of course, this does not mean that we rule out 
distinct trajectories or even stark differences. What we want to stress instead is that one must always 
reflect them against the common background of financialization. In the concluding paragraphs of 
this study, we now discuss the main implications of our results and the future options for research. 
 
 
1.5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This article has directed the attention of political scientists away from changes in the level or rate 
of public debt to the study of SDM. We have discussed a phenomenon which, until now, has almost 
fallen below the radar of debates in international and comparative political economy: the financial-
ization of SDM. Against this background, our main contribution is conceptual and descriptive. We 
have mapped a new research field for political science by providing a two-dimensional concept, 
including indicators and data. With these, we have also shown that the financialization of SDM 
exists and how it has spread across a subset of OECD countries. Transferring the term ‘financiali-
zation’ to the arena of SDM, we defined it via a two-dimensional concept as the increasing reliance 
on financial markets as governance mechanism and the adoption of sense-making frameworks 
grounded in financial economics that both define governments’ decisions about how and from 
whom they borrow. The financialization of SDM suggests the decline of the ‘old mode’ of SDM, 
which was very much based on hierarchy (for example, political determination of credit conditions) 
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or networks (for example, long-term relationship financing), and grounded in an intellectual frame-
work stemming from macroeconomics. 
 
The main result is that we discern a double trend of overarching commonalities and countryspecific 
differences in the financialization of SDM. This trend confirms Streeck’s (2012: 22) notion of a 
common trajectory of national capitalisms, ‘as result of their ever closer interaction in capitalist 
world markets’, on the one hand, and their ‘differentiation and specialization’ because of ‘differ-
ences in economic, political and ideational power’, on the other hand. 
 
Consequently, our analysis also suggests that further studies aiming to detect the determinants of 
the financialization of SDM should refer to both an increasing interdependence between capitalist 
political economies and country-specific trajectories because of domestic conditions. In the analysis 
of the commonalities that result from growing interaction, it might be of interest that our data on 
the timing of reforms reveal that the USA is the single innovator, followed by the early adopters 
Sweden, Finland and New Zealand (see supplementary file: Table 14). Krippner (2005, 2011) con-
firms this likely role-model function of the USA by showing that in the 1970s, the US government 
worked to create the world’s financial markets, because it was looking for a way to fund its debt. 
This implies that the USA was the first country interested in creating a market in sovereign debt. 
Global investment banks like Baring, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Salomon Brothers and UBS then 
triggered the spread of reform to other countries. Central bankers and debt managers of pioneering 
countries (USA, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden or Denmark) and international organisations (IMF, 
World Bank, OECD and UNCTAD) functioned as major transmitters (Nars 1997: 5, Australian 
National Audit Office 1999: 47, Wheeler 2000: 154–5, 2004: 22, fn. 4, Currie et al. 2003: 16, Gabor 
2012: 4–6; Grimpe 2012). This pattern resembles Streeck’s (2012: 22) explanation of the financial-
ization of the economy: ‘[I]f the United States adopts financialization as its preferred strategy of 
wealth creation, this redefines the constraints and opportunities for the rest.’ 
 
However, national differences are the other side of the coin. Obviously, one should not treat them 
as merely endogenous to economic conditions like the rise of information and communications 
technologies and the capital market pressures, which investors and institutional creditors exert on 
governments (Mosely 2015). Our data point to country-specific trajectories in the use of instru-
ments which are conditioned by domestic political economic institutions and conditions. They in-
clude pension schemes (e.g. Japan and non-resident holdings), the size of domestic capital markets 
(e.g. New Zealand and foreign currency bonds) or socio-economic contexts (e.g. Switzerland with 
low inflation risk and no ILBs). This signals that key characteristics of a country’s debt profile 
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remain contingent to a certain point and that further research should distil the political economic 
determinants thereof (Hoogduin et al. 2010, Breen and McMenamin 2013). These differences may 
also mirror country-specific interplay between economic, political and ideational power. 
 
Our notion of commonalities and differences happening simultaneously also addresses a broader 
discussion: Are governments playing, or played by, the market (Schelkle and Barta 2014)? Do sov-
ereigns use markets by making choices and do they still have autonomy (e.g. Mosley 2003, 2004, 
2010) or do markets use governments (e.g. Strange 1996, Streeck 2014)? With reference to this, our 
analysis provides evidence that one needs to take into account both arguments. In the financializa-
tion of SDM, politics and states do play a major role. Central bankers and debt managers were 
reviewing best practices in SDM and cooperating with investment banks to learn more about port-
folio theory and its application in practice. The negotiators of the Basel agreement had sufficient 
knowledge about how to boost the sovereign debt market through banking regulation. Moreover, 
the share of non-resident debt holders may depend on political factors such as the fractionalisation 
of political parties (e.g. Hoogduin et al. 2010, Mosley 2015: 158). However, it is also accurate to 
discern a rising influence of international financial markets on governments. This is not only evi-
denced by global investments banks as major transmitters of the adoption of portfolio theory in 
SDM or their role as primary dealers of government bonds. Both the global financial crisis and the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone nicely illustrate this. Examples like these support the 
view that financial markets exert discipline over EMU governments (Streeck 2014, Rommerskir-
chen 2015). Consequently, in a broader sense, our study indicates that the relationship between 
finance capital and governments in the SDM is complex, by no means one-sided and in flux. 
 
Our study not only contributes to the debate on the state–market nexus, but also alludes to the 
literature on the financialization of the state. Wang (2015) interprets this process as a shift towards 
the ‘shareholding state’ as an increasing shareholder and institutional investor in the economy. Our 
analysis, however, demonstrates that financial markets have also already entered the core domain 
of modern democracies: public finance and debt. Here, the question arises whether the financiali-
zation of SDM makes democratic borrowing control an intractable problem. Do parliaments, their 
commissions and supreme audit offices still understand the structure of government debt and the 
complex financial instruments debt managers use? In particular, the obvious non-transparency of 
sovereign swap deals may cast doubt on the possibility of adequate democratic control. Similarly, 
other conflicts may evolve, for example, between the roles of governments as prominent financial 
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market actors and market regulators: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Dealing with these questions prom-
ises further insights into the dynamics and prospects of the tight connection between financial 
markets and public finance as well as their democratic control. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank Renate Mayntz, Robert Boyer, our colleagues at the CCCP and the reviewers of this 
journal for their enlightening analytical advice. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the CES conference in Paris, 2015. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. So far, financial markets have punished not only central governments but also local administra-
tions for using derivatives. Notable examples are Orange County, CA, the London borough of 
Hammersmith and Fulham or the German city of Hagen. 
2. Of course, debt levels and fiscal policies play a role as SDM seeks to cut down interest payments 
on public debt and thus indirectly reduce its level. Still, SDM does not include debt ceilings or 
other austerity policies. 
3. Our sample contains different types of developed capitalist economies and thus is suitable for 
cross-national, inter-temporal comparison. Selecting 1980–2010 as our period of analysis is due 
to both data availability and the fact that the early 1980s saw the beginning of the financializa-
tion of the economy. As the OECD currently modifies its database, data end in 2010. 
4. One could also include other quantitative and qualitative indicators. However, due to the limited 
availability of cross-national data, we decided to concentrate on the nine we present in this 
paper. Other potential indicators are, for example: the introduction of risk-management soft-
ware, system based on Value-at-Risk, the performance of DMOs against pre-defined bench-
marks, the permission to use debt buybacks or Repos, the introduction of a regular issuance 
calendar or the possibility of stripping, that is, the separate trading of interests and debt titles in 
secondary markets. Another important aspect of SDM that underwent substantial changes are 
the maturities of outstanding debt. Although we had initially included them into our analysis, 
we finally decided to leave them out for two reasons. On the one hand, the data gaps are too 
large and the most common indicator for measuring maturities, the Macaulay duration, was not 
available for our country set at all; on the other hand, the correct interpretation of maturity 
requires enormous case-specific knowledge, for example, how maturities are combined with 
swap deals which make long-term maturities shorter. 
5. While marketable debt instruments include short-term (Treasury bills), medium-term (notes) 
and long-term securities (bonds), typical non-marketable debt instruments are foreign-currency 
loans, loans from financial institutions and savings bonds for personal investors (cf. Missale 
1999). 
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6. Hardie (2012) speaks of the financialization of the sovereign bond market, but he limits his 
analysis to emerging market economies and leaves out the management of sovereign debt. 
7. However, as was nicely demonstrated in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, central 
banks still have a certain influence on the interest rates of sovereign bonds. 
8. In a survey report about DMOs in OECD countries, McCray (2005: 75) notes that 55 per cent 
of all DMO staff are involved with middle office functions like portfolio management and risk 
management policy. 
9. We have extracted our metric data – for the indicators marketable debt, marketable debt held 
by non-residents and marketable debt in foreign currency – mainly from the OECD Central 
Government Statistics database (2015), the collections of Missale (1999) and Abbas et al. (2014), 
as well as further primary sources such as annual DMO reports or treasury bulletins. For these 
indicators, we report the annual country values of their share of total outstanding central gov-
ernment debt as well as their medians. However, the available sources did not allow us to trace 
back the year of their first use (with exception of ILBs). Metric data on the use of ILBs, which 
we did not include in the main text due to the word constraint, are listed in the supplementary 
file. Regarding the indicators auctions, primary dealer systems, accruals accounting, DMOs and 
swaps, it is not possible to measure them metrically, either because of their qualitative nature or 
due to the lack of availability of data. Therefore, we identify the year of their introduction, which 
enables us to describe the timing of the reforms across countries. Overall, we have also sent out 
email inquiries to several national debt managers and central bankers. Nevertheless, despite 
thorough consultation of the material, there are still notable gaps in the data. In cases of doubt, 
we sought to obviate these by incorporating only values we were able to cross-reference. Since 
our data remain partially incomplete, please check the annotations below each figure for details. 
10. Market liquidity generally refers to the ability of markets to facilitate quick transactions. This 
means, for instance, that once an asset is acquired, it can be sold again on short notice. 
11. In the cases of Luxembourg and Japan, there is however, a very small share of non-marketable 
debt held by nonresidents, which cannot be traded further on the secondary market. To the 
same extent, Switzerland has lately started to sell some titles to non-residents, although so far 
only less than 1 per cent. 
12. There are roughly three types of selling techniques: Auctions, syndications and issuance on tap. 
13. Most prominently, primary dealer systems typically include banks like Barclays, BNP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan, HSBC or Morgan Stanley. 
14. Rollover risk is refinancing risk that occurs when debt is about to mature. If interest rates de-
velop adversely when rolling over old with new debt, future payments are higher than before. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Which roads lead to Wall Street? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper investigates the financialization of regions in the European Union. It zooms in on the 
regional level and provides and systemic and macro-structural analysis of the factors that account 
an increase in finance and insurance activities. Theoretically, the argument highlights the crucial 
importance of various forms of indebtedness as the social, economic and political relationship that 
constitutes financialization processes. Empirically, the paper stresses the subnational dimension 
and thus contributes to fill an important, yet largely underappreciated gap in the political economy 
of finance. In order to fully grasp the extent to which financialization has transformed capitalism 
throughout the last three decades, it seems indispensable to include regions into the analysis. By 
injecting geography into the political economic debate, the paper might animate future research 
and a renewed discussion on regional specificities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Published in Comparative European Politics (2017), 15:4, 661-683) 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This article takes financialization and the new regionalism, two central developments that have 
shaped the trajectory of global capitalism in the last three decades, as a point of departure. Albeit 
many researchers so far have examined either of them in detail, systematic analytical links between 
both continue to be rather scarce. By taking up this task, I aim at partially filling this gap and 
contributing to a better understanding of how regions differ when it comes to the importance of 
finance. Specifically, I address the political economic literature on financialization. By focusing on 
regions, I seek to extend its structural and macroeconomic strand beyond nation states. Of course, 
this is an ambitious undertaking that clearly surpasses the limitations of one single paper. However, 
I strive to initiate a renewed discussion on the various regional trajectories of financialization within 
the common context of global financial market capitalism. Zooming in on regions within national 
political economies seems very promising since it enables scholars to identify important differences 
in a more fine-grained way while at the same time maintaining an aggregate level of analysis that is 
not present in studies of single cases. Consequently, the research question of this paper asks which 
causal factors account for variation in the levels of financialization of regional economies. This 
implies that I am specifically looking at whether different independent variables exert significant 
causal effects on my outcome of interest. In order to provide an answer, the article casts the net 
widely and extracts key causal factors out of a broad literature dealing with financialization and 
regional economies. The corresponding hypotheses are then subject to an empirical test by OLS 
regression analysis. The search for underlying causal mechanisms that actually link xn and Y by 
building on power, interest, legitimacy or function (Engelen 2008) is not part of this paper and thus 
up for future (case oriented) research. 
 
Before delving further into the theoretical foundations of the argument, it is necessary to render 
more precisely how the sometimes-fuzzy concepts of ‘‘financialization’’ and ‘‘regionalism’’ are un-
derstood. Regarding the former, I largely draw on structuralist and regulationist accounts (Brenner 
2000, 2004b; Stockhammer 2008; Krippner 2011; Lapavitsas 2011, 2013; Palley 2013). Yet, for the 
purpose of a feasible operationalization, I make use of an empirical simplification and conceptualize 
financialization as the increasing importance of the financial sector for the economy. Concerning 
regionalism, an equally manifold arsenal of concepts prevails, each with its distinct view of what a 
region actually is (Keating 1998, 2017). In this paper, I confine the region as an intermediate object 
of analysis to a political-administrative territorial unit that is situated between the state and the local 
level within a national political economy. 
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The main argument of this paper states that in order to understand the driving forces behind the 
financialization of regions one has not just to look at general financial market indicators but instead 
focus more closely on various forms of indebtedness. Of course, stock markets, financial assets 
and related services play a more and more important role for both economy and society. Central 
features of this development are for instance the shift of corporate profits toward the financial 
sphere, as well as the general run into financial investments during times of negative real interest 
rates. Nonetheless, what seems to be lying at the core of the financialization process and is thus 
(now) its main driving force is the explosion of corporate, household and government debt within 
the last decades. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: the next section discusses the liter-
ature on financialization and clarifies why it is important to specifically look at the regional eco-
nomic level. In addition, it defines the outcome under interest as the dependent variable based on 
the macroeconomic assessment of financialization as a structural phenomenon. The proceeding 
section three then elaborates on the centrality of debt for financial profits and thus also financiali-
zation. Consequently, the different causal hypotheses are derived from the literature and the con-
trols are explained. Afterward, section four presents the operationalization of the theoretical pre-
dictions, briefly explicates the method and data at hand and finally presents and discusses the em-
pirical results. Eventually, section five concludes with some recapitulating remarks on the implica-
tions for future research. 
 
 
2.2 Financialization and regions 
 
In recent years, scholars have been referring to the concept of financialization when analyzing the 
crucially influential role of finance for contemporary capitalism. The common denominator that 
unifies this new paradigm is a holistic view of finance. This means that financialization is about 
broadening the notion of finance beyond its mere role of allocating savings and channeling invest-
ment. Instead, a central argument is that the entire financial sector, including its actors and logics, 
keeps permeating other parts of the economy and society (van der Zwan 2014, pp. 99–100). Very 
often, individual studies take Gerald A. Epstein’s wider definition of financialization as ‘‘the in-
creasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’’ (Epstein 2005, p. 3) as a first step. From 
there on, they usually develop more specific concepts in order to apply them to their respective 
cases. Despite the large diversity of the financialization paradigm, one can identify four distinct 
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branches that make up the field. Research focuses either on individual firms, households, state 
actors or the economy as a whole (Christopherson et al. 2013; van der Zwan 2014). 
 
In this paper, I adopt a macrostructural stance and therefore mainly refer to the literature dealing 
with the financialization of the economy as a whole (Boyer 2000; van Treeck 2009; Krippner 2011; 
Lapavitsas 2013; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013). From this follow three important consequences that 
guide my analysis. First, and in a broader context, I regard financialization as the key dynamic of a 
finance-led accumulation regime (Boyer 2000). This implies that after the end of Fordism, contem-
porary political economies are characterized by the fact that ‘‘profits accrue primarily through fi-
nancial channels rather than through trade and commodity production’’ (Krippner 2005, p. 174).  
 
Figure 1: GDP shares of different economic sectors in the EU-18, 1995–2013  
Source: Eurostat (2015d), own illustration 
 
Research stemming from heterodox macroeconomics underpins this fact by highlighting the cross-
country importance of financial profits for different economies and the distributional conse-
quences, which arise from a regime of high risk and increased liquidity but overall stagnating growth 
(Orhangazi 2008; Stockhammer 2008; van Treeck 2009; Palley 2013). Second, I constitute finan-
cialization in relation to other economic sectors. This means that financialization is conducive to 
some, such as real estate and insurance activities or construction, while at the same time potentially 
harmful to others as in the case of manufacturing or agriculture (Crotty 2005; Aalbers 2008, 2009). 
Third, I view financialization as a forceful and procedural phenomenon that unfolds over time and 
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is constantly reinforced. As it is the case with many other grand concepts in the social sciences (like 
globalization or neoliberalism), making an empirical argument about financialization bears the dan-
ger of mixing up dependent and independent variables, a problem that is known as analytic error 
of the first degree (Engelen 2008). For the purpose of this analysis, I treat financialization as my 
dependent variable (or my outcome) defined as the share of finance and insurance activities in the 
gross domestic product. 
 
In order to get a feeling for the financialization at work, Fig. 1 displays the relative importance of 
different economic sectors in the 18 EU countries that are analyzed in this paper.1 Before zooming 
in on regions, it is useful to get a first overview of the aggregate share of finance and insurance 
activities in national gross domestic product. What stands out concerning its development over 
time vis-a`-vis the other relevant GDP contributors of industry, construction and services, is the 
unparalleled ascendency starting in the early 2000s. Before the start of the new millennium, ‘‘ser-
vices’’ were the only economic sector with an actual increase in its GDP share compared to the 
mid-1990s. However, given its ample range covering personal and retail services, science, commu-
nication, commerce, real estate and many more (G–J, L–U), anything but a rising share would have 
been irritating for developed capitalist economies. In contrast, the industrial economic core of 
mining, pharmaceuticals, chemistry, metalworking, textiles and others (B–E) has witnessed a con-
stant decline by losing more than 15% of its initial importance. On the other hand, finance and 
insurance activities (K) took off after 2002 and quickly surpassed the service sector to become the 
most dynamic economic sector until the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In addition, 
three supplementary observations further illustrate this dynamism. First, albeit interrupted by a 
brief slump, finance exploded again before ultimately cooling off recently while still being at an 
almost equal pace with services. Second, the corresponding boom of construction occurs at a sim-
ilar pace to finance, since financialization connects the inflation of property and real estate prices 
with financial products and profits (Smart and Lee 2003; Aalbers 2008, 2009; Rolnik 2013). Third, 
Fig. 1 might thus actually underestimate the real importance of finance for the economy since 
financialization also boosts certain real estate activities (L) and finance-related services (parts of M) 
that are included in the broad services category of the graph. 
 
In addition to financialization, the second crucial trend in the development of contemporary capi-
talism has been a new regionalism. Prior to its academic recognition, regional differences were 
widely perceived as vanishing relics, soon to be leveled out by neoliberal catch-ups and homoge-
nizing globalization. However, as it was the case with financialization research and its critique of 
the mainstream concept of financial intermediation, the tide has turned. Issues like uneven regional 
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development, the centrality of city regions, new transnational (cross-border) regions and an increas-
ingly fierce inter-regional competition for capital and growth have revitalized the interest in regional 
analyses (Agnew 2000; MacLeod 2001). Surprisingly though, political economy as a discipline has 
yet to fully appreciate this promising research area. Regions, it seems, by and large still constitute a 
terra incognita in this regard. Nonetheless, important studies have made inroads into this field. 
They have dealt with role of cities in the global economy (Le Gale`s and Harding 1998), new forms 
of regional or structural policies favoring internationally competitive areas at the expense of others 
(Crouch and Le Gale`s 2012) and the importance of sectoral systems of production as regional 
‘‘varieties of capitalism’’ (Crouch et al. 2009; Schro¨der and Voelzkow 2016). 
 
Yet, when it comes to finance, political economic contributions with a regional focus remain sparse. 
A notable exception has been Richard Deeg’s (1999) seminal work on the role of banks for German 
capitalism in which he differentiated between the regional systems of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and 
North Rhine-Westphalia. On the other hand, economic geography has been more vivid in this 
respect, dealing with questions of how to systematically incorporate finance (Pike and Pollard 2010; 
Sokol 2013, 2017), avoid ‘‘fetishizing the national scale’’ (Christophers 2012) or trace the geograph-
ical spread of finance as essential component of its development (Leyshon and Thrift 1997). This 
has produced a number of interesting case studies scrutinizing the geographical distribution of risk, 
locational specificities of distinct financial actors, such as pension funds and investment banks, or 
the spatial connection of different areas via profit-seeking practices of mortgage funds (Corpataux 
et al. 2009; Wainwright 2012; Zademach and Musil 2014). 
 
Despite all progress, there are still many blind spots given the centrality of both regions and finance 
for contemporary capitalism. This is where the paper at hand comes in and seeks to address some 
of them. By linking the macrostructural political economic literature on financialization to the re-
gional geographical dimension, I strive to shed light on some important aspects of the financiali-
zation process as a whole. First, I aim at widening the still limited country focus. Although there 
are some remarkable extensions (Lapavitsas and Powell 2013; some studies from heterodox mac-
roeconomics or a 2015 special issue of Socio-Economic Review), most of the scholarly contribu-
tions concentrate on the USA or the UK. Second, I seek to overcome the methodological nation-
alism by analyzing regions within political economies. Third, by providing a systematic account for 
the driving factors behind financialization, I supplement our empirical understanding of this im-
portant phenomenon. In accordance with my argument elaborated above, I define the financiali-
zation of regions as the share of finance and insurance activities in regional GDP. I am aware that 
this narrow and relatively simple way is prone to critical discussion as it cannot capture the entire 
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complexity. However, I argue that for the sake of analytical clarity and large-n comparability this 
simplification is indispensable. One reason is that data are still scarce when it comes to the regional 
level, especially in connection with finance. Moreover, potential future analysis might draw on my 
findings and provide more in-depth and case-based knowledge on how regional financialization 
actually unfolds. 
 
Before I turn to the theoretical elaboration on potential causal factors of regional financialization, 
it makes sense to first become familiarized with the existing variation of the outcome. Figure 2 
maps the empirical landscape of the EU18. It illustrates the share of finance and insurance activities 
in regional gross domestic product for the year 2013 in relation the average of 3.32% for the sample. 
The color of each region depends on its financialization level. While both white and light gray 
colorings denote lower levels of financialization, dark gray and black depict highly financialized 
regions. The map reveals several interesting characteristics. First, variation within national political 
economies differs from country to country. While some economies like the Netherlands (high) or 
Finland (low) are relatively homogeneous, others like Poland consist of many heterogeneous re-
gions. Second, there is no clear connection between the number of highly financialized regions 
within a country and its economic wealth, measured as GDP per capita in 2013 (Eurostat 2017). 
On top of the spectrum, Sweden and Finland possess high GDP per capita values (45,400 € and 
37,400 €) but feature only one highly financialized region each (Stockholms la¨n and Helsinki-
Uusimaa). In the bottom half, Spain and Italy score low on GDP per capita (22,000 € and 26,500 
€) but are home to several regions with (very) high financialization levels (such as Comunidad 
Valenciana, La Rioja, Friuli-Venezia Giulia or Liguria). Third, many of the most highly financialized 
regions are either those of capital cities (Wien, Bruxelles-Capitale or Attiki), established financial 
centers (Hessen, London or Lombardia) or other urban economic hubs (Hamburg or Porto). 
Fourth, however, there are a number of fascinating cases that break up this geographical trinity of 
finance. These cases deserve special attention and a closer look. They can be largely grouped into 
three distinct categories, each unveiling interesting insights into the multifaceted geography of re-
gional financialization. 
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                       Figure 2: The Financialization of European regions in 2013 (NUTS) 
            Source: Eurostat (2015d), own illustration 
 
The first category covers regions with access to large oil or natural gas reserves. Prime examples of 
this are Scotland in the UK and the Dutch province of Groningen. On a smaller scale, one might 
argue that these two highlight the importance of rentier income for financialization since the ex-
traction and refining of hydrocarbons not only requires huge capital investments, but also creates 
immense surplus value that has to be channeled and diversified into other profitable sectors. Fi-
nancial actors like investment banks, insurance companies or (sovereign) wealth funds play an im-
portant part in this process (Haberly 2011; Wang 2015). 
 
The second category comprises former industrial regions that were hit hard by the crisis of Fordism 
and its symptoms of urban decay, job losses in manufacturing, depopulation and—as a result—
fiscal dead ends. Some of these regions were able to turn toward new economic models of tertiar-
ization, albeit with polarizing side effects as employment in low-killed services is usually the flipside 
of financial, IT and creative settlements (Moulaert et al. 2005; Carter 2016). Instances of this are 
regions like Yorkshire and the Humber in the UK including Sheffield and Leeds, the province of 
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Antwerpen in Belgium, the German Saarland or Zachodniopomorskie in northwestern Poland with 
the city of Szczecin. The third and last category contains regions that are economically lagging 
behind and have low levels of GDP per capita in 2013 (Eurostat 2015c). While Puglia in Italy 
(17,200 €), Extremadura in Spain (15,200 €), Terras de Trás-os-Montes and Douro in Portugal 
(12,500 € and 11,800 €) and Warminsko-Mazurskie in Poland (7300 €) belong to the poorest group 
in the sample with GDP per capita values between two-thirds and less than a third of the median 
EU region (25,500 €), they all reach (very) high financialization levels. This seems puzzling at first 
sight, but makes sense if one considers the centrality of debt for financialization processes—the 
main causal argument of this paper. Furthermore, some scholars have already begun to conceptu-
alize and analyze the center-periphery divide and uneven geographical development through the 
lens of financialization (Becker et al. 2010; Rodrigues et al. 2016; Sokol 2017). Dynamics between 
more developed (dominant) and less developed (dependent) economies do not just unfold on the 
national scale but are also clearly at work on the regional level, as Fig. 2 hints at. 
 
 
2.3 What drives regional differences in financialization? 
 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, this section deduces the main factors that are supposed to 
exert a causal effect on the financialization of European regions and the variation of the dependent 
variable as illustrated in the previous paragraph. Following the main argument of this paper, various 
forms of debt are hypothesized to be driving forces behind regional financialization. In order to 
generate profits financial actors can engage in different activities, all related to the credit–debt 
nexus. I subsume these activities under the simplified labels of interest, investment and income and 
will briefly elaborate on each by focusing on the centrality of debt for financial profits (Lapavitsas 
2013, pp. 138–68; Christophers 2015; Sokol 2017).2 The first activity has the purpose of generating 
interest gains and involves lending money to others. This is for example the case when a financial 
institution, like a bank, makes a commercial loan to a business or a mortgage loan to a household. 
In its simplest form, this activity expresses a direct credit–debt relationship with the bank as the 
unmediated beneficiary. The second activity aims at realizing investment gains. Here the financial 
institution makes a financial investment such as buying shares, bonds or real estate. However, in 
many cases this is done as part of an investment fund alongside other financial institutions. The 
fund then invests into a portfolio of financial assets and distributes realized profits among its con-
tributors. As a result, the investing financial institution is the mediated beneficiary of various indi-
rect credit–debt relationships that the fund has vis-a`-vis third parties. The third and last activity 
has the aim of generating fee income. This can be the case when a financial institution either takes 
investment decisions on behalf of other private investors or designs and sells a derivative product 
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based on underlying assets like car loans or credit card payments. In both instances, the financial 
institution is the mediating beneficiary and is paid a fee for its service. In his sophisticated discus-
sion of the origins and form of financial profits prevalent in the era of financialization, Costas 
Lapavitsas (2013) not only traces their underlying social character, but also stresses their crucial 
commonalities. Summing up, whether one considers simple loans, investment in equity or complex 
derivative products resulting from securitization: In the end some are always obliged to pay a share 
of expected future profits or revenues—such surplus value, labor compensation or taxes—to oth-
ers who claim entitlement rights. Because this logic is essentially inscribed into the contemporary 
accumulation regime, financialization represents a unique phenomenon based on the centrality of 
debt for financial profits. This becomes especially clear when investigating the evolution of private 
and public debt in the EU18. Figure 3 depicts this development for the three levels of governments, 
(nonfinancial) corporations and households from the base year 1995–2013. 
  
Figure 3: Public and private debt as GDP ratios in the EU-18, 1995–2013 (1995 = 100)  
Source: Eurostat (2016), own illustration 
 
In general, it becomes immediately evident how the overall level of indebtedness has skyrocketed 
across the board. The only temporary exception has been the government sector, which, prior to 
the global financial crisis, reduced its debt level by 31 points (1996–2007), but then almost doubled 
by reaching 143 at the end of the period. Whereas in the beginning it was mainly the corporate 
sector that recorded substantial increases in debt, within the last ten years especially household debt 
has risen drastically from 105 (2003) to 166 (2013). Finally, there is another interesting peculiarity: 
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While in the first eight years (1995–2003) debt of financial and nonfinancial corporations (NFC’s) 
evolved simultaneously, later on the growth rate for NFC’s slowed down and its supporting role 
was substituted by households. This seems in line with general long-term findings for the EU, 
which state that it is now mainly consumer credit and mortgages—as opposed to low borrowing 
levels by NFC’s—that accounts for the majority of lending by monetary financial institutions (ECB 
2017: C5, C6). Following this overview, I now dissect all three sectors individually and deduce the 
corresponding hypotheses. 
 
 
2.3.1 The role of sovereign, corporate and household debt for financialization 
 
Starting with the first, I look at the effect of sovereign debt on variation in regional financialization. 
Notwithstanding the ambivalent development sketched above, sovereign debt is crucial for finan-
cialization processes. Historically, the change from the tax to the debt state in the 1980s was ac-
companied by financial liberalization and the deregulation of capital markets (Streeck 2014). Alt-
hough interrupted by stints of consolidation and the spread of austerity policies in major capitalist 
economies, sovereign debt and the development of financial profits have been inextricably inter-
twined. The influence of financial markets on state institutions can be grasped as a financialization 
of the state (Pacewicz 2013; Kirkpatrick 2016; Lagna 2016; Fastenrath et al. 2017). This includes 
the use of financial instruments and private sector risk models when managing sovereign debt, the 
window dressing of public balance sheets or even designing complex financial products to fund 
projects that were formerly subject to tax financing. Also global financial advisory organizations 
like the IMF stress the importance of government bonds for deepening and widening financial 
markets (Chami et al. 2009). Others highlight its function as collatoral for money and credit creation 
(Gabor and Ban 2016). Therefore, sovereign debt is an important source of financial profits and 
hence contributes to financialization. First, bondholders may directly cash in on interest payments. 
Moreover, holding sovereign bonds as collaterals enables financial institutions to engage in riskier, 
potentially more profitable deals, while selling securitized bonds can also generate additional fee 
income. Accordingly, (H1) reads: The higher the ratio of sovereign debt to GDP, the higher the 
share of finance and insurance activities. 
 
The second level deals with corporate debt and its effect on regional financialization. While it is 
clear how the financial industry influences financialization, also non-financial corporations contrib-
ute to this process. Following the crisis of Fordism, modes of corporate governance have funda-
mentally changed. What has emerged is a new ‘‘finance conception of control’’ (Fligstein 1990, p. 
226) that permeates the corporate field with the ultimate aim of maximizing the shareholder value 
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of the firm (Lazonick 2010; Styhre 2015). On the asset side, NFCs nowadays generate an increasing 
share of their profits through financial activities (Krippner 2005; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013; Al-
varez 2015; Soener 2015). On the liability side, corporate funding has shifted from bank loans to 
financial markets, for example through the issuance of shares. Both trends epitomize and funda-
mental transformation of the non-financial corporate sector toward a new strategy of downsize 
and distribute (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). This implies the adaption of the short-termism in-
herent to many profit-generating, and sometimes speculative, financial market practices. In contrast 
to the previously prevalent procedure of retain and reinvest, NFCs very often seek to increase their 
corporate value via stock buybacks, financial outsourcing and attracting international investors. As 
a consequence, the involvement of NFC’s in financial markets for instance by holding financial 
assets, generating dividend and interest income or spending revenue on financial payments has 
been increasing (Orhangazi 2008). Here, similar to sovereign debt, corporate debt affects financial-
ization. When NFCs pay interest or dividends to bondholders and shareholders, they generate in-
come for financial investors that are usually large banks or investment funds. In addition, paying 
interest on classic long-term bank loans has the same effect. Therefore, (H2) states: The higher the 
ratio of corporate debt to GDP, the higher the share of finance and insurance activities. 
 
The third and final level covers the role of household debt for financialization. As we have seen, 
this has especially been on the rise since the early 2000s. Financial markets influence households in 
many ways since they have multiple options to participate in financial activities. Akin to the trans-
formation of non-financial corporations, families and individuals have been more and more en-
meshed by an everyday culture of finance that encourages them to evaluate their own financial 
situation against the portfolio background of assets and liabilities (Martin 2002; Langley 2008b; 
Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Regarding assets, households are integrated into pension fund cap-
italism, which they hope will allow them to mitigate risks like old-age retirement via successful 
financial investments (Clark 2000; Dixon 2008). Regarding liabilities, credit-based consumption has 
become more and more important to stabilize domestic demand as a form of privatized Keynesi-
anism (Crouch 2009). Both can have transformative repercussions on political economic institu-
tions (Mertens 2015), but it is the latter where the effect of household debt most obviously visible. 
On the one hand, the growing involvement of private households in retail estate through mortgages 
is an important vehicle of financialization (Aalbers 2008, 2009). On the other hand, the general 
expansion and booming appreciation of credit cards fuel private consumption as well as financial 
profits (Langley 2008a, b). Hence, (H3) assumes: The higher the ratio of household debt to income, 
the higher the share of finance and insurance activities. 
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2.3.2 What else? Controlling for other factors 
 
In addition to different forms of debt, I include a battery of ten controls that also might cause 
variation in the financialization of regions. I grouped them into general financial market indicators, 
economic sectors and politico-demographic context. The first group accounts for five of the stand-
ard proxies that are commonly used in studies of financialization, financial globalization and finan-
cial market integration. I expect all of them to correlate positively with my outcome. They are (1) 
the banking leverage of the economy understood as the total percentage of bank assets in equity, 
(2) the volume of foreign direct investments measured as inflows in percent of GDP and (3) the 
degree of stock market capitalization relative to the gross domestic product of an economy. The 
final two financial market controls are both dummies and play a specific role regarding my case 
selection of European regions. While (4) measures if the region is home to a global financial center 
as a hub of the finance and insurance industry (Kindleberger 1974; McGahey et al. 1990; Cassis 
2006), control (5) asks whether the region is in a country that has a global lead currency, another 
decisive factor for financialization (D’Arista 2005). For the case of the Eurozone for instance, Rossi 
(2013, p. 397) notes that ‘‘the merging of national currencies into a single-currency area has intro-
duced a further factor of financialization.’’ The second group of controls covers two additional 
economic sectors that are connected to finance and insurance. As some of the seminal structural 
accounts on the rise of finance have elaborated (Brenner 2000, 2004b; Krippner 2011), I assume a 
negative correlation between control (6) manufacturing and the level of regional financialization. 
In contrast, control (7) real estate activities acknowledges the amplifying role of the housing busi-
ness in facilitating financialization (Smart and Lee 2003; Aalbers 2008, 2009; Botzem and Dobusch 
2012). The politicodemographic context composes the third and final group of controls. This 
seems important since regions vary substantially concerning both their levels of autonomy and 
population density. On the one hand, control (8) measures regional political autonomy as institu-
tional depth, judicial and political competences. On the other hand, control (9) covers regional 
financial autonomy in borrowing, spending and raising taxes. I assume both autonomies to be am-
biguous regarding the direction of their causal effects. While a more autonomous region for exam-
ple could voluntarily choose financialization as a perceived path toward sustainable growth, regions 
facing financial and political constraints could also feel forced to turn toward financial markets as 
their last resort. The final control deals with the presumably positive correlation between financial-
ization and (10) population density. This relates to the important function of cities and city regions 
for economic development in contemporary capitalism (Brenner 1998, 2004a; Sassen 1990, 2001; 
Le Gale`s and Harding 1998; Crouch and Le Gale`s 2012). 
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2.4 The financialization of regions: empirical results 
 
For my empirical analysis, I used a standard OLS regression model without interaction terms.3 In 
order to account for the hierarchical structure of my data I calculated robust standard errors along 
country clusters. I refrained from applying multi-level modeling since the number of cases on level 
II (countries) is too small in relation to the number of independent variables on the same level 
(Maas and Hox 2005). The analysis includes 274 regions on the NUTS 1–3 levels of 18 European 
countries (Eurostat 2015e) with a selection based on three criteria: (1) membership in the EU, (2) 
the existence of a genuinely regional level with political competences4 and (3) comprehensive data 
availability. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Swe-
den and the UK (for details, see ‘‘Table 3, Appendix’’). For the metric variables (all except financial 
center and lead currency), I used standard ways of operationalization and calculated three-year 
means for the 2011–2013 period (for details, see ‘‘Table 4, Appendix’’). Political and financial au-
tonomy are based on the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016). Regarding my causal 
argument, (H1) is operationalized by two variables (sovereign debt and sub-national debt). While 
the same applies to (H2) (debt of non-financial firms and debt of financial firms), the operational-
ization of (H3) only includes one variable (household debt).5 
 
Table 1 reports the standard descriptive statistics and gives a good overview of the sample. Some 
regions that stand out are for example Bruxelles-Capitale as the most densely populated one with 
more than 7200 inhabitants per km2 vis-a`-vis the most northern region in the sample, Lappi in 
Finland with only 2 inhabitants per km2. Political Autonomy is relatively high in federal states like 
Germany or Austria with a score of 10 in both, compared to countries such as the UK or Ireland 
with scores of 4 and 3, respectively. 
 
Manufacturing is still decisively important in many eastern European regions like Koma´rom-
Esztergom in Hungary with a share of more than 40% in regional GDP or Zl´ınsky´ kraj in the 
Czech Republic where it contributes around 36%. While household debt is highest in Denmark 
with more than three times the annual personal income, Slovakia scores low with only 50%. Finally, 
the most financialized region in the sample is London with its famous City as global financial center 
and a GDP share of finance and insurance activities of 16.64%. On the bottom end of the distri-
bution is the Polish region of Wielkopolskie with only 0.47% in regional GDP. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of all variables Source: own illustration 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Outcome 
Regional financialization 
274 3.32 2.31 .47 16.64 
Debt 
Sovereign debt 274 94.56 30.04 54.04 153.14 
Sub-national debt 274 11.00 7.82 1.59 32.52 
Debt of non-financial firms 274 506.97 170.19 235.23 817.32 
Debt of financial firms 274 5.58 3.66 1.36 15.32 
Household debt 274 124.40 58.64 53.92 314.52 
Financial market Banking lev-
erage 274 1686.71 800.06 686.38 3488.80 
Foreign direct investment 274 2.64 2.86 -0.63 13.39 
Stock market 274 43.18 24.97 4.77 102.25 
Financial center 274 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Lead currency 274 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Economic sectors Real es-
tate activities 274 9.22 2.90 1.15 21.34 
Manufacturing 274 15.72 8.08 1.95 53.14 
Politics and demographics 
Political autonomy 274 6.83 2.64 2 11 
Financial autonomy 274 2.21 2.01 0 6 
Population density 274 277.85 719.40 2 7234.73 
 
 
To estimate the effects of the different forms of debt on regional financialization, I calculated five 
models (M1–M5) that all underwent standard post-regression diagnostics. Data showed some out-
lier cases (London and Iˆle-de-France) causing modest non-normality in the distribution of resid-
uals. Since they might distort the estimators due to my relatively small sample size, I ran separate 
models without them. However, this did not substantively change the regression results, so I opted 
to keep them. Furthermore, running a robust regression with country-clustered standard errors 
helped me to address the problem of heteroscedasticity. Multiple checks for multicollinearity 
showed no signs of concern. Although I sought to model the influence of debt on regional finan-
cialization as careful and parsimonious as possible, the complete model (M4) still contains 15 var-
iables, which, due to the relative small sample size of N = 274, limits the possibility of significant 
causal effects. 
 
In order to obtain robust results, I decided to calculate a separate model for each form of debt 
(M1–M3) while keeping the other variables as controls. All variables with a significant effect in 
either model were then also included in the simplified model (M5). Table 2 displays the results.  
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Table 2 Regression results 
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Debt 
Sovereign debt 
 
.009 
(.009) 
  
.009 
(.009) 
 
Sub-national debt -.015 
(.025) 
  -.025 
(.025) 
 
Debt of non-financial firms  .001 
(.002) 
 -.001 
(.002) 
 
Debt of financial firms  -.027 
(.095) 
 -.001 
(.071) 
 
Household debt   .012*** 
(.003) 
.013*** 
(.002) 
.012** 
(.004) 
Financial market  
Banking leverage 
 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.001*  
(.003) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000*  
(.000) 
Foreign direct investment .029 
(.083) 
.047 
(.092) 
.083 
(.063) 
.060 
(.059) 
 
Stock market .013* (.005) .006 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.006) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.008) 
Financial center 3.855*** 
(.631) 
3.886*** 
(.654) 
3.745*** 
(.576) 
3.720*** 
(.595) 
3.658*** 
(.533) 
Lead currency .626 
(.686) 
.539 
(.662) 
.260 
(.541) 
.380 
(.510) 
 
Economic sectors  
Real estate activities 
 
-.109 
(.112) 
-.076 
(.096) 
-.017 
(.048) 
-.030 
(.060) 
 
Manufacturing -.000 
(.034) 
-.005 
(.032) 
.003 
(.027) 
.008 
(.027) 
 
Politics and demographics 
Political autonomy 
.028 
(.090) 
.012 
(.142) 
.078 
(.095) 
.090 
(.124) 
 
Financial autonomy .001 
(.151) 
-.019 
(.174) 
-.038 
(.140) 
.011 
(.156) 
 
Population density .001** 
(.000) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
Constant 1.343 
(1.274) 
1.627 
(1.763) 
-.202 
(.754) 
-.457 (1.067) .662 
(.608) 
N 274 274 274 274 274 
R2 .576 .574 .627 .634 .612 
Level of significance: * p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001 
 
Concerning both public and corporate debt, the findings are ambiguous. While the effects of sov-
ereign debt on the national level and debt of non-financial firms follow the assumption of a positive 
relationship, interestingly, sub-national debt and debt of financial firms possess a negative algebraic 
sign. Nevertheless, neither effect is statistically significant. The opposite holds true for household 
debt. In all models (M3–M5), there is a highly significant positive effect that is also larger than that 
of the other debt variables. Regarding the controls, first, it is important to note that only stock 
market capitalization (M1) and banking leverage (M3) have comparatively small and statistically 
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weak effects, which also become less impactful or even insignificant in the simplified model. In 
contrast, having a financial center exerts a strong effect on regional financialization as is expected, 
while the large coefficient is due to its binary character. Finally, population density is highly signif-
icant and across all models. This seems small, but results from its operationalization. All other 
sectoral and political factors are clearly non-significant. 
 
Regarding the coefficients of determination, it stands out that all models, which include household 
debt, have a higher R2 value. Even the simplified model (M5) with R2 = .612 has substantial explan-
atory potential. Finally, it is worth having a closer look at the strengths of the three significant 
effects (financial center, population density and household debt). For a better exemplification, it 
makes sense to empirically illustrate the marginal effects of each variable. For the case of financial 
centers this is straight forward since it is either present in a region or not. Still, this makes a differ-
ence of roughly 3.7 percentage points regarding the share of finance and insurance activities in 
regional GDP. When dealing with population density, the ceteris paribus effect at first sight seems 
to be rather minor. However, in the long run it might substantially contribute to an increase in 
financialization as the following simple and cautious example illustrates: The Spanish region of 
Comunidad Valenciana already has an above-average level of financialization (Fig. 2) and is – ac-
cording to official EU projections – expected to experience a population growth of more than 30% 
or almost 1.5 million people from 2008 to 2030 (Eurostat 2010). Under the given conditions, this 
increase in population density by 63.57 inhabitants per km2 would account for a rise in regional 
financialization by 0.063 percentage points, equaling another € 62.5 million. Lastly, and potentially 
even more severe could be the effect of growing household debt. As Fig. 2 shows, between 1995 
and 013 household indebtedness has risen by almost 70%. If we now assumed a slower but steady 
growth by 30 percentage points until 2030, this would entail an increase in regional financialization 
by around 0.36 percentage points. Other things being equal, for the median region in the sample 
this would result in an additional contribution of € 58 million by finance and insurance. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have analyzed the financialization of regions in the European Union and thus con-
tributed to a broader understanding of one of the crucial political economic dynamics in contem-
porary capitalism. My main objective was to extend the political economic literature on financiali-
zation by combining a structural framework with a large-n comparison on the regional level. The 
main results show that, in addition to common financial market indicators, especially household 
debt is a major driver of regional financialization. This finding opens the door to a more complex 
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argument about both financialization in Europe and regional development. In this regard, there 
seem to be three central implications. 
 
First, as we can draw from the map of regional financialization in the EU, there are puzzling cases, 
which are focal points for finance. Many of them are located in traditional financial centers or 
economically powerful areas of the core member countries. Still, some are scattered throughout 
peripheral economies or can be found in regions that have been lagging behind. Also, there are a 
number of emerging financial centers and interesting territorial units in Southern and Eastern EU 
members, sometimes as ‘‘islands of financialization’’ that are surrounded by lessfinancialized re-
gions. Therefore, one might argue that financialization has led to a new form of uneven develop-
ment within Europe through of form of asymmetric (financial) integration (Agnew 2001; Becker 
and Ja¨ger 2012; Becker et al. 2013). Furthermore, we can also turn the table and look for reverse 
causality. This means that preexisting and reinforced asymmetries across regions could then actually 
contribute to specific forms of financialization. Secondly, already before the outbreak of the recent 
global financial crisis, numerous commentators had been warning about the perils of rising house-
hold debt. Whether one points to the indirect expropriation by financial market mechanisms (Lapa-
vitsas 2013), the partial and temporary substitution effect for stagnating wages as in privatized 
Keynesianism (Crouch 2009) or the role of mortgages in different ‘‘varieties of residential capital-
ism’’ (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Wood 2016), private debt indeed fuels financialization. These 
aspects then also relate to questions about different political economic growth models (Baccaro 
and Pontusson 2016) and their sustainability. Household debt can generally spur domestic con-
sumption, but also mitigate lower wages in export-oriented economies. Hence, it might contribute 
to intra-European macroeconomic imbalances and have a destabilizing effect (Horn et al. 2010). 
Thirdly, we can look at the bigger picture of European integration and its consequences for regional 
financialization. For the EU, financial market integration with its goals of harmonization and global 
competitiveness has been a key project since the 1990s (Bieling 2013). In this context, policy makers 
are linked to large financial actors with transnational interests (Mu¨gge 2006), which might lead to 
a concentration of market power and attacks on alternative forms of banking (Seikel 2014). As a 
consequence, European integration shapes regional financialization and can have widespread im-
plications for strategic investment decisions, like capital flows, or everyday financial infrastructure, 
as it is the case with retail banking. 
 
Despite the contribution of the paper, there are also clear limitations. However, they might animate 
the discussion on finance and regions and encourage future research. Here, there are at least four 
promising desiderata. The first would be to broaden the empirical scope by including other relevant 
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economies and making use of most recent data. Acknowledging the importance of the regional 
dimension and financial indicators, statistical offices keep improving availability and accessibility. 
Secondly, backing up quantitative findings with structured and focused case studies would enhance 
our understanding of regional financialization processes. This would enable to analyze different 
causal mechanisms and paths toward financialization, especially regarding the interplay of institu-
tions, ideas and power and the regional level. Speaking about causality, we could thirdly take a step 
backward in the causal chain and for example ask why and under which circumstances households 
become more indebted. Drawing on the main finding of this paper, such an approach could single 
out regional specificities of finance–debt dynamics. In this context, one could also focus on regional 
financial actors, like savings banks, and their role in promoting or inhibiting financialization 
(Mertens 2016). Last but not least, a fourth target for future studies might be the interaction of 
financial actors across different regions. In this regard, the ‘‘financial chains’’ that link economic 
spaces (Sokol 2017), for instance via credit, investment and networks, could be a point of departure. 
Since financial, political and economic distortions continue to be pressing issues, the financializa-
tion of regions remains relevant for academics and politics alike. 
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Notes 
 
1. Industry sectors are according the official Eurostat classification of NACE Rev. 2 (European 
Communities 2008) with abbreviations in parentheses. The analysis includes 18 member coun-
tries of the European Union, referred to as the EU-18 (for details regarding case selection and 
data composition, see ‘‘The financialization of regions: empirical results’’ section and ‘‘Table 3, 
Appendix’’). The period of analysis ends in 2013 for the sake of consistency throughout the 
paper as comprehensive and comparable data have been available up to this point. 
2. Christophers (2015) actually differentiates between fees, gains, premia and spread. However, I 
argue that for the purpose of this paper I can rightfully subsume all four of these under my 
trichotomy of interest, investment and (fee) income. 
3. All mathematical operations were calculated with STATA 14.1. 
4. This excludes the two levels of Local Administrative Units (LAU 1-2) that are used in EU 
statistics and were formerly known as NUTS 4-5 (Eurostat 2015e). 
5. I initially included residential loans as an additional variable for (H3), but decided to drop it 
because of its too strong correlation with household debt. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Case selection, territorial units and NUTS levels 
Country NUTS Territorial unit Cases 
(of total) 
Austria 2 Länder 09 (09) 
Belgium 2 Provincies/Provinces 11 (11) 
Czech Republic 3 Kraje 14 (14) 
Denmark 2 Regioner 05 (05) 
Finland 3 Maakunnat/Landskap 19 (19) 
France 2 Régions 22 (27) 
Germany 1 Länder 16 (16) 
Greece 2 Περιφέρειες (Periferies) 13 (13) 
Hungary 3 Megyék 20 (20) 
Ireland 3 Regional Authority Regions 08 (08) 
Italy 2 Regioni 21 (21) 
Netherlands 2 Provincies 12 (12) 
Poland 2 Wojewo´dztwa 16 (16) 
Portugal 3 Entidades Intermunicipais, Região Autónoma dos Açores y 
Região Autónoma da Madeira 
30 (25) 
Slovakia 3 Kraje 08 (08) 
Spain 2 Comunidades Autónomas, Ciudades Autónomas 17 (19) 
Sweden 3 Län 21 (21) 
UK 1 Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, 
Government Office Regions of England 
12 (12) 
Total   274 
Source: Eurostat (2015d) 
For some countries, the number of selected cases differs from the actual number of the respective NUTS level. 
For France, the five overseas territories (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, La Réunion and Mayotte) are left out. 
The number for Portugal is actually higher, because case selection is based on the former classification of NUTS 
2010. Since the political-administrative reform and the territorial rearrangement related to the current NUTS 2013 
division have entered into force in 2015, it would not have been compatible with the other data used in this anal-
ysis. Finally, in the case of Spain, the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are excluded. 
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Table 4 Operationalization of variables 
Group No. Name Operationalization 
(I) Debt 01 Sovereign debt Consolidated in % of GDP 
 02 Sub-national debt Percentage of GDP 
 03 Debt of non-financial firms Liabilities in % of GDP 
 04 Debt of financial firms Liabilities in % of GDP 
 05 Household debt Debt in % of income 
(II) Financial market 06 Banking leverage Assets in % of equity 
 07 Foreign direct investment Net inflows in % of GDP 
 08 Stock market Percentage of GDP 
 09 Financial center Yes/no 
 10 Lead currency Yes/no 
(III) Economic sectors 11 Real estate activities Gross value added in % of GDP 
 12 Manufacturing Gross value added in % of GDP 
(IV) Politics/demographics 13 Political autonomy Regional Authority Index (0–11) 
 14 Financial autonomy Regional Authority Index (0–7) 
 15 Population density Inhabitants per km2 
Sources: AK VGRDL (2015), GUS (2015), ECB (2016); Eurostat (2015a, b, c, d, 2016); Hooghe et al. (2016),  
IMF (2016), OECD (2013), Quandl (2016), Z/Yen Group (2014). 
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Arbeitskreis ‘‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder’’ im Auftrag der Statistischen 
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Chapter 3 
 
Leading by Example? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
To identify changes in financial systems is fundamental for understanding political economies. 
Dealing with the financialization of savings banks in Germany this paper contributes to filling a 
gap regarding two crucial yet underappreciated topics: the financialization of banks themselves and 
the role of alternative and public monetary financial institutions in time of global finance. Hence, 
the paper first develops a two-dimensional concept of the financialization of banking, before con-
ducting a cross-temporal description of two diverse cases as a structured, focused comparison. 
Building on rich empirical evidence, I argue that we can find ample proof for a process of a differ-
entiated financialization in terms of both a shift towards market-based banking and the adoption of a 
financial logic. Challenging conventional notions of savings banks, my findings provoke a renewed 
discussion about capillary percolations of financialization and the pitfalls they pose to alternative 
banking in public and regional finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Paper submitted to World Politics, 26 March, 2018) 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
“Since unification the German financial system broadly has moved to a significant degree away 
from a bank-based towards a market-based financial system” (Deeg 2010a: 117-118).  
 
Very often, defining trends and developments in the world of finance, like the one expressed in 
the introductory quote, are associated with big players such as international commercial banks, 
investment banks or hedge funds. Consequently, a large part of the academic literature puts them 
at the center of attention. However, if we assume the entire financial system to gravitate towards a 
globally integrated, interdependent and intertwined cosmos, understanding how the whole variety 
of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) evolves seems mandatory. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, the political economy debate about the role of special banks and other MFIs gained 
momentum. A number of contributions took up the challenge and have investigated building so-
cieties (Marshall et al. 2012), Landesbanken (Seikel 2014; Trampusch et al. 2014), central banks (Braun 
2016; 2018), shadow banks (Ban and Gabor 2016; Helgadóttir 2016) or development banks 
(Mertens and Thiemann 2017; 2018). Looking for analyses of savings banks in this stream of liter-
ature, it becomes clear that they usually approach the topic differently. Studies either ask in which 
way national sectors have transformed in the long run (Italy and France) (Butzbach 2015; 2016), 
how savings banks have been transmission belts or fire accelerants of the financial crisis (Spain) 
(Ruiz et al. 2016; Portas 2017) or in how far they are affected by EU regulation (Deeg and Donnelly 
2016; Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Semenyshyn 2017).  
 
Notwithstanding the important insights previous research on savings banks has generated, I depart 
from this route in some ways and aspire to supplement the existing debate with a new perspective. 
By connecting different dots from strands of political economy, economic geography, sociology 
and banking and finance, I develop a comprehensive concept of a financialization of banking as a 
major phenomenon within the financial gearbox of contemporary capitalism. Since it is necessary 
to first empirically validate any phenomenon before testing causal claims, this paper presents a 
theory-driven descriptive analysis that seeks to identify fundamental change over time. I follow 
Caramani’s (2010) pronounced accentuation of the importance of cross-temporal description for 
political science, which “allows us to assess the empirical balance between similarity and dissimilarity, 
(…) to get dependent variables right (…) (and) to discover phenomena” (Caramani 2010: 43, italics in orig-
inal). Focusing on savings banks in Germany then permits me to amend the work on changes in 
national financial systems and the role of public banks with both a financialization perspective and 
a systematic case study. Given the crucial position that thrifts still occupy in the German political 
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economy, identifying financialization would challenge their image as providers of patient capital 
via traditional banking. I aver that this view is actually too lopsided and that digging deeper helps 
us to get a more nuanced understanding of what is really going on in the world of German savings 
banks. Consequently, the two research questions of this paper read: Does the financialization of savings 
banks in Germany exist and, if so, how does it present itself?  
 
Tackling these questions also implies disaggregating the sector and refining case selection. Albeit 
usually discussed in their entirety, German Sparkassen are independent institutions. They are orga-
nized in 12 regional associations, each with a separate support fund and deposit protection scheme. 
On the national level, every regional association is a member of the German Savings Banks Asso-
ciation (DSGV), a complex network organization that also accommodates other institutions like 
the Landesbanken, building societies or insurance companies. As of 2016, there are 403 savings 
banks in Germany, of which 398 operate under public law (DSGV 2017).1 As public banks, Spar-
kassen are either operating within the boundaries of cities, districts (Landkreise) or associations of 
districts (Zweckverbände). To factor in this enormous heterogeneity, I draw on Gerring and Cojocaru 
(2016) and narrow down my selection to two diverse cases, that represent typical subtypes of the 
distribution. Since previous research has emphasized the difference between small and large savings 
banks (Seikel 2014; Trampusch et al. 2014), I apply a standard criterion for bank size, the balance 
sheet total, as the descriptive feature that is excluded from my case study but serves as the basis for 
case selection (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution as a box plot. With 
a median of 1.86 billion Euro, the landscape is fragmented and dominated by small and medium-
sized savings banks. On the other end, notable players possess balance sheet totals that are multi-
ples of the median, ranging from ten billion (Dortmund or Düsseldorf) to up to twenty billion 
(Frankfurt) and more.    
 
Source: DSGV (2017), own illustration. 
 
Sparkasse KönBonnStadtsparkasse Bad Honnef
0 7,000 14,000 21,000 28,000
Figure 8: Balance sheet totals of German savings banks, 2016 (in MEUR). 
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Out of this bandwidth I select the Sparkasse KölnBonn, Germany’s biggest savings bank under public 
law with a balance sheet of 27.1 billion Euro, and the Stadtsparkasse Bad Honnef, number 368 and 
on the bottom end of the first quartile with less than 0.5 billion Euro. Both are members of the 
same association, the Rhenish RSGV, which further enables to control for the regional context. 
With reference to the basic methodology of a structured, focused comparison, I apply the same 
analytical framework to both cases (George and Bennett 2004). To empirically validate my concept, 
I have collected, extracted and analyzed an extensive amount of primary source data from annual 
reports, press releases and local newspapers. Furthermore, I have conducted five expert interviews 
with high representatives from different savings banks. I focus on the time period of 1986-2016, 
thereby setting the year of the ‘Big Bang’ as starting point, and the year of most recent data availa-
bility as the end of my analysis. 
 
To answer my research question, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next 
section I connect the literature on the political economy of banking with the work on financializa-
tion and develop my concept. Section three elaborates on measurement and operationalization 
from the dimensional to the indicator level. This is proceeded by section four, which situates the 
two cases in the general context of savings banks in Germany and the Rhineland. The main section 
five then presents the actual case study and investigates the development of the Sparkassen over 
time. Finally, the concluding section six discusses the results and reflects on the broader implica-
tions of my findings. 
 
 
3.2 Financialization and the political economy of banking 
 
In the academic literature on banking, traditionally two streams stand out. One stems from com-
parative political economy (CPE) and the other from economics. Despite many differences, both 
place banks in the dichotomy of market-based vs. bank-based financial systems. While the former 
are characterized by the prevalence of capital markets as major channels of investments and sav-
ings, the latter rely more on bank loans and patient capital. From an economics perspective, the 
debate centers around what determines the development of a certain type of financial system 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999; Ergungor 2004) and which one is preferable in terms of eco-
nomic growth (Levine 2002; Chakraborty and Ray 2006). In CPE, the usual point of departure is 
John Zysman’s (1983) seminal contribution on national financial systems and governments’ ability 
to shape industrial policies. There, he singles out “three models of finance” (Zysman 1983: 69), 
each characterized by a distinct relationship between financial institutions, non-financial firms and 
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state bureaucracies. Although Zysman puts no explicit focus on banks as such, as he is more inter-
ested in structural interactions of different actors, his study highlights central aspects of banking, 
like the roles of commercial, public and investment banks, the importance of long-term versus 
short-term credit or the influence of states and (capital) markets on bank behavior (Zysman 1983).  
 
For many years, much of the institutionalist CPE literature dealing with banks and finance has been 
deep-seated in the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework, and has thus, by and large, maintained 
the ideal-type dichotomy between bank-based and market-based systems (Hardie, Maxfield and 
Verdun 2013). In addition, studies guided by VoC rarely dealt with finance on its own, but regularly 
asked how financial systems institutionally complement Liberal or Coordinated Market Economies. 
Therefore, changes in finance were usually looked at according their impacts on corporate govern-
ance and coordination mechanisms within the economy (Vitols 2005). Despite essential insights 
such as the unraveling of the former Deutschland AG in Germany (Beyer and Höpner 2003; Deeg 
2010a), different patterns of (non-)change across countries (Culpepper 2005) or internal differen-
tiation regarding firm size and strategy (Deeg 2009), it seems that banking and finance have been 
mainly treated in relation to non-financial firms, if not merely as add-ons. Yet, all these findings are 
crucial. They form the starting point on which my study builds, but also, from which it departs.    
 
Since “all financial systems in advanced capitalist economies have changed substantially over the 
last two decades (…) and many see them converging on a market-based system” (Deeg 2010b: 
315), the question remains what these dynamics mean for banking. In general, one would assume 
a decline in traditional relationship banking, the increasing reliance on capital markets for funding 
and investment, the acceptance of a higher degree of risk and, finally, a decreasing provision of 
patient capital (Deeg and Hardie 2016). While many observers point out to the leading role of large 
commercial banks and investment funds, special banks are usually victimized or seen as innocent 
and unaffected. In order to fully comprehend what has been going on in banking, I argue that it is 
promising to reflect the aforementioned wide-ranging developments as the financialization of banking. 
 
As an interdisciplinary framework, financialization stresses the role of financial actors, institutions 
and logics and their influence on the economy, politics and society as constituents of present-day 
capitalism (Epstein 2005; van der Zwan 2014). Following Lapavitsas (2011), one can point out 
three fundamental elements of financialization: the acquisition of financial capacities by large non-
financial corporations, the expansion of financial market mediation by banks and the increasing 
financial involvement of households as both creditors and debtors. In addition, a fourth element 
concerns the financialization of the state and its institutions on different levels of government 
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(Fastenrath et al. 2017, Lagna 2016, Peck and Whiteside 2016). For all these elements, banks hold 
a central position. Whether directly or indirectly involved, they not only function as important 
transmitters of financialization but are equally affected by these very same processes. First, when 
NFCs increase their financial capacities, relationship banking is challenged. Second, when house-
holds become more integrated in financial markets, this opens up new business areas in banking. 
Third, when governments issue bonds via primary dealers or use tools like tax increment financing, 
bank loans as a traditional means of public funding become less important. Eventually, a combi-
nation of these aspects then in the end fosters the expansion of and reliance on financial market 
mediation on the side of banks.  
 
Although financialization research has established itself within both comparative and international 
political economy, there is still a long and rocky road ahead. In this regard, analyses covering the 
financialization of banking in general and the role of public or special banks in particular, largely 
remain a path yet to be traveled. Consequently, before trying to measure the financialization of 
banking it must be singled out as a stand-alone concept. I suggest to capture via two-dimensions, 
the intensification of market-based banking and the adoption of a financial logic as guiding principle for 
corporate reorganization and a changing business model. 
 
The first dimension, market-based banking (Hardie et al. 2013a; Hardie and Howarth 2013b), allows 
to overcome to persistent dichotomy in the political economy of finance. By avoiding to squeeze 
the entire national financial system into either category, market-based banking (MBB) acknowl-
edges the fundamental, yet heterogeneous, change going on in finance. In contrast to a narrative 
that interprets common trends across financial systems as moves towards a disintermediated, cap-
ital markets-based ideal type, market-based banking continues to highlight the importance of banks 
as key actors (Hardie and Howarth 2013b). Therefore, it is able to capture developments, which 
differ in degree but point into the same direction. In their concise analysis of eight Western econ-
omies, Hardie et al. (2013a) carve out the main components of market-based banking. Rather than 
possessing financial power over credit and interest on their own, the general dynamic stems from 
the banks’ fortified integration financial markets and their dependence on them. This means that 
on both the assets and liabilities side banks increasingly enter market transactions. Two stylized 
examples can illustrate this trend. First, regarding liabilities, banks shift away from traditional de-
posit business. Instead, they more and more tap on direct market sources for funding, for example 
by issuing bonds or engaging in credit relationships with other financial institutions. Secondly, con-
cerning bank assets, both the composition and importance of conventional loans alter. On the one 
hand, a rising share of the money banks lend goes to other financial institutions, as inter-bank 
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loans, or households, as consumer or mortgage credit. On the other hand, banks also directly look 
for other profitable financial investments more openly. Examples of this are increased securitiza-
tion activities or portfolio trading (Hardie et al. 2013a).2 To a large extent, these changes have es-
pecially affected the classical business of many retail banks. A fact that is exposed by the importance 
of fee income compared interest gains. However, this “retail revolution” (Ertürk and Solari 2007: 
378) would not be complete without taking the redesign of banks as broad financial service pro-
viders, their very own rebranding and, ultimately, the deep-rooted changes in their business model 
into consideration. This is where the second analytical dimension of my concept comes into play.  
 
Complementing MBB, the adoption of a financial logic is the flipside of the financialization of bank-
ing. Although scholars from different disciplines have picked up aspects of what I want to stress 
with this dimension, there is no coherent use of the term. Broadly speaking, financial logic (FL) 
refers to many intangibles of economic activity, such as culture and cognition. They affect business 
models, strategies, behavior and organizational structures. Mirrored by households, corporations 
and organizations, a financial logic for instance reflects the attitudes and practices of everyday bor-
rowing and credit (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Langley 2008), changing business models (Alman-
doz 2012; Botzem and Dobusch 2017; Froud et al. 2017) or sense-making frameworks within or-
ganizations (Fastenrath et al. 2017; Fligstein et al. 2017). Despite the manifold reception of FL char-
acteristics, I argue that we can distill two central anchor points as a recurrent theme: first, the notion 
of risk and its management, and second, the recalibration of the various bank-stakeholder relation-
ships by prioritizing certain groups over others. A defining characteristic of globalized financial 
markets is not only their growing complexity, including the construction of the products sold in 
them, but also the luring promise of quick and high returns. As a consequence, economic actors 
that participate in financial markets have to take into account the varying degrees of risk inherent 
to the transaction they engage in. Therefore, over the course of the deepening and widening of 
these markets, different techniques have been developed to cope with this problem and move ‘from 
uncertainty toward risk’ (Carruthers 2013) as the history of credit rating agencies exemplarily 
demonstrates. If the risk-return dichotomy is constituent to financial markets and financialization 
implies their increasing importance, we can assume risk management to become integral to this 
process. This is in line with what Fligstein and Goldstein (2015: 578) discern as a ‘deepening culture 
of risk-taking’ as part of an overarching emergence of a ‘finance culture’. In their study on the 
financialization of sovereign debt management, Fastenrath et al. (2017) make a similar case by 
pointing to the fact that financialization carries with it a shift towards financial economics in the 
way how the economy is perceived. For them, one of the decisive features is the establishment of 
risk identification and management structures within debt management offices. Complementary to 
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the centrality of risk is the association of a financial logic with the more general trend of changing 
corporate business models, as “the collection of organizational actions taken to meet the organiza-
tion’s primary objectives” (Froud et al. 2017: 2). The substantial issue here is that a business model 
not only informs about what a company does to create value and in which way this is executed. It 
furthermore gives us insights on the ecology of the firm, namely its relationship to different stake-
holders. Identifying a trade-off between financial viability and stakeholder credibility, Froud et al. 
(2009) distinguish a public from a private sector business model. Subsequently, this is amended by 
analyzing financialized business models of UK retail banks (Froud et al. 2017). Having emerged 
after the 1986 Big Bang, this model privileges one key stakeholder group, shareholders as investors, 
over others such as the government, employees or customers. In order to maximize the return on 
equity (ROE), a given bank is eager to cut costs, close branches, develop new property lending 
schemes and reduce traditional savings and loan activities. Concentrating on shareholders at the 
expense of other stakeholders, I argue, expresses not only a shift towards a financialized business 
model, but rather unveils the more fundamental consolidation of a financial logic. However, since 
savings banks fall into the category of ‘alternative banks’, which spans from public banks over 
cooperative banks to postal savings banks and others, we have to put certain restrictions to the 
applicability of a simple shareholder-value orientation. As Butzbach and von Mettenheim (2015) 
highlight, alternative banks share common characteristics regarding their goals, governance and 
business model that differ from private banks. Moreover, as public-law institutions, German sav-
ings banks are not allowed to sell equity to private investors.3 Thus, for the purpose of my analysis, 
I emphasize that the translucency of a financial logic in the business model has to be captured as a 
stronger pronunciation of cost-return calculations at the expense of maintaining a tight stakeholder 
relationship vis-à-vis the local public or community. In other words, “doing business” becomes 
more important while the provision financial inclusion takes the backseat. 
 
3.3 Measuring the financialization of banking 
 
Based on the aforementioned theoretical elaboration I now turn to my operationalization. Follow-
ing Goertz (2006) Table 1 untwines the concept of a financialization of banking, the phenomenon 
on the basic level. Its two dimensions, MBB and FL form the secondary level, before the indicator 
level specifies the precise measurement. As the first dimension covers market-based banking as a 
reinvention, I include revenues, assets and liabilities of banks, three distinct categories related to 
this development (Erturk and Solari 2007; Hardie et al. 2013a; Hardie and Howarth 2013b; Hardie 
and Macartney 2016).4 While traditional banking is largely based on generating interest income via 
loans, their role diminishes in the market-based counterpart. There, in comparison to classic credit 
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business, other sources of income such as fees and securities become more important. Fees are real-
ized via an array of very different contractual and advisory activities of which investments on behalf 
of clients and insurance sales are the most prominent ones. For example, Allen and Santomero 
(2001) argue that rising shares of fee income have been a crucial part of financial sector changes 
during the 1990s, while Lepetit et al. (2008) connect this trend to declining interest margins for 
banks across Europe. Complementing the revenue trinity, income from securities occurs via pro-
prietary trading, a characteristic once nearly exclusively ascribed to large investment banks (Erturk 
and Solari 2007). From an accounting perspective, the assets side of balance sheets informs us 
about the future benefits a company can expect based on the use of its economic resources. Assets 
can be tangible, such as actual buildings, or financial, like loans and securities. I break down the 
balance sheets into loans and securities, while splitting the former into money lent to nonfinancial bor-
rowers (companies, individuals, public authorities) and credit granted to monetary financial institutions. 
In addition to trading activities, such a differentiation allows me to identify a potential increase in 
volume of interbank lending. This is especially the case when we look at a bank’s liabilities. They 
form the verso of a balance sheet and list the economic resources of a company, including the ones 
it owes to outside parties. In other words, while the composition of the assets side tells us where a 
bank puts its money, the liabilities side shows where it is coming from. There are mainly three basic 
types to account for: Liabilities vis-à-vis non-financial institutions cover traditional customer deposits, 
liabilities vis-à-vis monetary financial institutions report interbank loans and securitized liabilities include 
obligations and other securities a bank might issue to raise capital. Growing shares of the latter two 
and a smaller role played by former are another fundamental feature of market-based banking 
(Hardie et al. 2013a; Hardie and Howarth 2013b). 
 
Table 1: The financialization of banking: dimensions, categories and indicators. 
Concept 
(basic level) Financialization of banking 
Dimensions 
(secondary level) Market-based banking Financial logic 
Indicators 
(indicator level) 
Interest income (-) 
Fee income (+) 
Income from securities (+) 
Loans to nonfinancial borrowers (+/-) 
Loans to MIF’s (+) 
Securities (+) 
Liabilities vis-à-vis non-financial inst. (-) 
Liabilities vis-à-vis MFI’s (+) 
Securitized liabilities (+) 
Active risk management 
Changing staff structure 
Outsourcing 
Downsizing 
Internationalization 
Brand building 
 
Source: own illustration. Note: Signs in bracket indicate a positive or negative trend regarding financialization. 
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The second dimension deals with the specifics of what I call financial logic. Although German savings 
banks continue to be a special MFIs which are territorially bound and not solely for-profit, I argue 
that it is necessary to also focus on developments which are mostly not directly reflected in balance 
sheet numbers. As formulated in the preceding section, a specific notion and handling of risk as 
well as the percolation of a financialized business model are crucial. Part of the general trend in 
international banking has been the addition of a “new market portfolio” to the traditional “credit 
portfolio” (Aglietta and Breton 2001: 441). However, making use of new instruments and invest-
ment opportunities requires the complementary implementation of an active risk management, the 
first indicator of my second dimension. Examples are for instance the application of credit-scoring 
techniques (Leyshon and Thrift 1999) or the use derivatives to hedge against price volatility (de 
Goede 2004) as a characteristic of intensified integration into global capital circulation (LiPuma 
and Lee 2005). This goes hand in hand with a changing staff structure, very often associated with 
sharper separation between front and back offices. An illustrative example is the hiring of special-
ized mathematicians or physicists to carry out complex modeling techniques (Fastenrath et al. 2017). 
This is connected to my next indicator, outsourcing. It highlights the significance of hiving off certain 
tasks or sometimes entire departments of a firm. Concerning banking this includes most promi-
nently IT and information systems (Baldwin et al. 2001). On a larger scale, many of these changes 
can be ascribed to corporate transformations in the era of global financial markets. Studies of cor-
porate governance have extensively analyzed parts of such restructuring efforts by firms that are 
now “managed by markets” (Davis 2009) and subdued to a “finance conception of control” 
(Fligstein 1990) while seeking to maximize shareholder value (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). 
However, as public-law institutions, German savings banks are, until now, not subject to the intru-
sion of private (international) investors. Yet, as economic actors, I assume them to be exposed to 
economic pressure from financial market competition. Although they have to fulfill the public task 
of providing access to credit and supplying broad strata of society with a financial infrastructure, 
being competitive and increasing their turnover has become more and more important for them 
(Interviews II and III). Such a potential tension between markets, the public and the community 
can easily put savings banks in a quagmire. I argue that a reconfiguration of the banks’ relationships 
to various stakeholders has taken place. As a consequence, cutting costs and becoming more prof-
itable and competitive now, ultimately, trumps other objectives. The next indicator, downsizing, inter 
alia reports branch closures, a crucial, and geographically unevenly spread trend in banking (Hack-
ethal 2004; Leyshon et al. 2008). Next, I assume to detect aspects of internationalization, which does 
not necessarily imply to go abroad and open new offices. Also, fostering international networks 
and assisting internationally-oriented customers in cross-border activities are emblematic features 
thereof. Finally, strategies of brand building complete my FL dimension. Superficially yet prominently 
  82 
exemplified by “the new layout of, and activity in, bank offices” or bank branches “dominated by 
cubicles and work stations” (Erturk and Solari 2007: 369), banks reinvent themselves to be able to 
cater the needs of very different stakeholders. Furthermore, central themes or catch phrases like 
being “modern”, “dynamic” or “equipped for the future” can be attributed to brand building. 
 
After having developed the concept and indicators, I now turn my cases. In the next section I 
briefly recall the role of saving banks for the German political economy and their history in the 
Rhineland. Following this, I analyze the financialization of the two Sparkassen KölnBonn and Bad 
Honnef. 
 
 
3.4 Savings banks in Germany: the case of the Rhineland 
 
For a long time, Germany has been characterized as the epitome of a bank-based financial system, 
due to the prevalence of its Hausbankprinzip and the centrality of different categories of banks for 
credit provision and industrial development (Deeg 2009; Detzer et al. 2017). Although the 1990s 
sparked substantial change on several levels, the country’s banking sector remains more fragmented 
and universal than those of other developed capitalist economies (Detzer et al. 2017; Hackethal 
2004). Part of this fragmentation is the unique structure of the German banking system, in which 
three distinct pillars of private, public and cooperative institutions coexist. While the former have 
traditionally been responsible for large industrial development and, especially in recent years, inter-
national investment banking, the latter are not strictly profit maximizing. Among them, savings 
banks, going back to 1801, when the first Sparkasse was founded in Göttingen, have been playing 
an important role for lending, financial infrastructure and industrial development on the regional 
and local level. They were the place to go for craftspeople, the evolving urban working and middle 
class, SMEs or local public entities (Detzer et al. 2017). Demonstrating their resiliency, the Spar-
kassen have withstood economic and financial crises as well as fierce liberalization attempts by the 
European Commission and private commercial banks over the course of the past thirty years 
(Seikel 2013; Thomes 2013). Today, they “(…) have proved to be a stabilizing factor for the Ger-
man financial system and economy” (Bülbül et al. 2013: 10). Figure 2 depicts their prominent posi-
tion in the domestic market in 2016. With a share of 27 % in total lending to the nonfinancial sector 
and a deposit share of 26 % respectively, savings banks battle with their private competitors for 
the pole position and outperform credit unions easily in this regard.5 Although the overall situation 
of the domestic business in the German banking system seems to have largely stabilized since the 
new Millennium, we can discern two interesting trends, which might hint at an ultimate reversal: 
first, savings banks have increased their share in lending to nonbanks by eight percentage points 
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since 2000, while private banks have stagnated. Second, the deposit share of the thrifts has re-
mained constant, whereas private banks made substantial inroads to this area and have now taken 
the lead with an increase of ten percentage points in the same period of time (Bundesbank 2018; 
Bülbül et al. 2013). 
 
Figure 9: Market shares, domestic transactions with Non-MFIs in 2016, lending (left), deposits/borrowing (right). 
Source: Bundesbank (2018), own illustration. 
 
However, since the DSGV serves as a national umbrella organization with strong regional mem-
bers, we have to study savings banks on the sub-national level to effectively assess their importance 
and separate changes from continuities. In his in-depth study on the political economy of the Ger-
man Länder, Deeg (1999) for instance stresses the roles of savings banks for regional economic 
policy networks in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). In both, the Spar-
kassen were crucial for more decentralized SME financing and flexible sectoral reorganization. 
Comparing the rise and fall of two of the most important Landesbanken, the (former) WestLB of 
NRW and the Bavarian BayernLB, Trampusch et al. (2014) highlight very often contradictory role 
played by the savings banks and their regional associations. In either case, thrifts were eager to keep 
the Landesbanken out of the market for SME lending. Additionally, a second line of conflict emerged 
in NRW, where there was a noticeable divide between large and small savings banks. While the 
former, which are mainly located in the Rhineland, like Köln, Bonn or Düsseldorf, dominated the 
RSGV as their regional association, the latter formed the majority in the SVWL, representing the 
Northeastern part of the state.6 Until the WestLB was first split up in 2002, before being finally 
dissolved ten years later, both savings banks associations regularly clashed over the course of action 
the Landesbank should take and the priorities it should set in its business model (Trampusch et al. 
2014). But these type of diverging interests do not solely come to the fore on between different 
associations. They have also been existent within the RSGV itself, as there had been many smaller 
institutions in the past, before their number started to decrease due to mergers or ‘acquisitions’ by 
larger thrifts.7 As of now, there are currently thirty-one independent savings banks in the RSGV 
area. Figure 3 maps the geographical spread of its members. It covers the Western part of North 
Private Banks 27%
Savings Banks 27%Landesbanken 10%
Cooperative Banks 18%
Others  18%
€ 3.274 billion
Private Banks 36%
Savings Banks 26%
Landesbanken 8%
Cooperative Banks 19%
Others 11%
€ 3.327 billion
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Rhine-Westphalia, that consists of two of the state’s five administrative regions, with Köln as me-
tropolis and Düsseldorf as state capital. While thrifts in the Rhineland normally operate in neigh-
boring territories that are larger in rural and smaller in urban areas, some institutions conduct busi-
ness in non-adjacent municipalities, usually as a result of functional alliances.  
 
Source: RSGV (2018), Wikimedia Commons8, own illustration. 
 
Before a long process of sectoral consolidation started, the story of the Rhenish savings banks had 
been one of expansion and growth. Their roots can be traced back to the 1840s, when the first 
wave of rapid thrift formations took place (Pohl 2001). This development culminated in the crea-
tion of the predecessor to the RSGV in 1881 (RSGV 2006b). Since their inception, the Sparkassen 
played a vital role in supporting economic development. Most importantly, the provided financial 
services to working class families and small business, encouraging the former to save for the future 
and granting loans for equipment acquisitions to the latter. In the following turbulent decades, 
savings banks first went through a long phase of stabilization and solidification, before the Great 
Depression and World War II, left the entire country, including its financial system, in total devas-
tation. Yet, in the postwar years, the Sparkassen were a crucial pillar of economic and financial 
reconstruction. They participated from the long boom period the same way they contributed to it. 
Coincidently, around the same time Germany’s economy witnessed its first (minor) recession in 
Figure 10: Business area of the RSGV and its members. 
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1967, the circumstances, under which the savings banks operated, slowly but steadily began to 
change as well (Pohl 2001).  
 
In that same year, following the decoupling of bank interest rates, which had previously been tied 
to official Bundesbank rates, “savings banks entered market competition” (RSGV 2006b: 6).9 During 
the heated discussions in the former Central Credit Committee (Zentraler Kreditausschuss – ZKA) that 
preceded this decision, the Sparkassen feverishly argued for a deregulation, which they saw as a 
promising liberation from more than thirty years of political intervention by federal institutions 
(Hillen und Forndran 2003). Further notable modifications were first, the amendment to the NRW 
Savings Banks Act in 1970, which fostered a further professionalization by encouraging mergers 
and establishing new salary structures for board members, and second, the introduction of a series 
of new investment opportunities for the customers, such as obligations or coupon bonds (Pohl 
2001). Overall, a combination of structural changes in the economic context, gradual political de-
regulation efforts, the introduction of new financial products and a diversification of customer 
behavior lead to a very different outlook for savings banks. It was this regional expression of a new 
environment, that had come about on a broader scale in the realm of finance over a span of nearly 
two decades, which ultimately set the tone for the developments that followed suit from the mid-
1980s onwards. Famously exemplified by the 1986 Big Bang, financialization began to take off and 
turned the world of banking upside down. 
 
 
3.5 The financialization of savings banks 
 
Starting in the 1980s, many core features of the long-standing activities of RSGV savings banks 
came under pressure. Most importantly, the mortgage loan and local authority loan business, two 
former pillars of their day-to-day operations, became less profitable. Due to fiercer competition 
from Landesbanken and mortgage banks, the implementation of municipal budget restraints as early 
signs of austerity, and a generally slackening construction activity regarding private residential build-
ings, thrifts had to adjust to new conditions (Pohl 2001; RSGV 1987). In addition, over the thirty-
year time span of my analysis, there were further scope conditions one has to consider. First, net 
yields and bank rates, which, despite two brief steep peaks in 1988-91 and 2000-01, were on a 
secular decline (Bundesbank 2018b). Second, customers became more sensitive regarding risk, re-
turn and duration of their assets. Third, the rising importance of participating in stock market and 
the corresponding technological change had to be embraced by all banks alike (RSGV 1989). 
Fourth, further liberalization and deregulation efforts in the context of EU financial market inte-
gration as part of the SEM program like the Capital Liberalization Directive (1988), the Investment 
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Services Directive (1993), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004) and, in between, 
the establishment of the Euro as a common currency in 1999/2001 (Bieling 2003). Fifth, the 1995 
amendment to regional NRW Savings Banks Act, which had been lobbied for by the RSGV for 
years in advance. The new law introduced the so-called constricted universal banking (“eingeschränktes 
Universalbankprinzip”), thereby allowing savings banks more flexibility in conducting their opera-
tions by reducing regulations and opening up new business areas (RSGV 1995). Sixth and finally, 
the German unification offered new market shares to compete for and many possibilities for busi-
ness expansion through the integration of the DDR savings banks into the DSGV. It is important 
to note that nearly all these developments were highly anticipated and strongly supported by the 
savings banks (e.g. RSGV 1988; 1990; 1995). 
 
This multifaceted picture forms the background against which I now seek to trace the financializa-
tion of Rhenish savings banks according to my indicators. I first put an emphasis on the assumed 
shift towards market-based banking, before I then deal with the adoption of financial logics in 
more detail. Recalling my case selection, I specifically focus on the two savings banks of KölnBonn 
and Bad Honnef as diverse cases. The former resulted from a merger between the regional savings 
banks powerhouses of Köln and Bonn in 2005, which themselves date back to 1826 and 1844 
respectively and underwent different restructurings throughout their existence (SK KölnBonn 
2018a). With a balance sheet total of 27.1 billion Euros, the Sparkasse KölnBonn is currently the 
biggest savings bank under public law in Germany. The latter, the Stadtsparkasse Bad Honnef, was 
founded in 1897. With a balance sheet total of 471 million Euro, it is among the thirty smallest 
thrifts in Germany. Although the local savings bank has always been overly proud to remain an 
independent institution that had withstood all trends of mergers and sectoral concentration (Inter-
view I; SSK Bad Honnef 1997), it finally announced in December 2017 to start negotiations to join 
its much bigger neighbor, the Kreissparkasse Köln (General-Anzeiger 2017), which itself is the prod-
uct of a many of formerly independent thrifts. 
 
3.5.1 Dimension one: market-based banking 
 
Starting with my first three indicators, figure 4 breaks down the earnings reports of the two savings 
banks into interest income, income from securities and fee income.10 It becomes immediately clear 
that with the exception of very few years in the late 1980s and early 2000s, which correspond to 
the aforementioned brief peaks in net yields, both thrifts realized the majority of their profits as 
non-interest income. Only recently, after the financial crisis, and only in the case of the SK Köln-
Bonn, interest income surpassed the 50 % mark in comparison to the other two sources of revenue. 
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Overall, we see an increasing importance of fee income for both Sparkassen, which more than dou-
bled from 12-15 % in 1986 to roughly 30 % in 2016. Correspondingly, income from securities 
always formed a significant part of the revenue structure, with constant shares of 40-50 %, until an 
observable reduction took place in the same period as interest income started to rise again.  
 
Figure 11: Sources of income in % of total profits, 1986-2016 
Sources: Annual reports and Bundesbank (2018a); own illustration.  
 
 
In this respect, a number of peculiarities and additional aspects have to be kept in mind, which 
clarify the centrality of fees and securities. First, income from securities is partially related to fee 
income. On the one hand, Sparkassen practice proprietary trading (depot A), and thus realize direct 
securities income. On the other hand, they perform fee-based retail brokerage (depot B). Second, 
the other major form of fee income stems from selling real estate and insurance contracts. This is 
either done directly by the savings banks or via the respective specialized companies of the Fi-
nanzgruppe like the Provinzial insurance, the LBS building societies, which are strong players in the 
regional real estate markets, or the DekaBank, a large investment and asset management firm. Third, 
savings banks in general as well as KölnBonn and Bad Honnef in particular, have notably closed the 
gap to private banks regarding net non-interest income as the average difference between them has 
shrunk from around 15 percentage points to just 5 in 2016 (Bundesbank 2018a; figure A1, appen-
dix). These tendencies are backed up by further evidence from annual reports and interviews. The 
SK KölnBonn for example mentioned insurance and real estate activities as “becoming more and 
more important” and “market segments with growth potential” (SSK Köln 1998: 18). The smaller 
SSK Bad Honnef states that it puts a “main focus” on “transactions on a commission basis” and 
that it will “push to seize its full potential in the business area of retirement provisions” aiming at 
a “holistic financial counseling that increases the use of financial products by its customers appro-
priate to different phases of life” (SSK Bad Honnef 2007: 17). One interviewee remarked that, 
since the end of the 1990s, for the smaller Sparkasse, retail brokerage was the dominant aspect 
within the general trend towards a diversified investment strategy that also included product con-
tracts outside the Finanzgruppe with partners such as JP Morgan or Flossbach von Storch (Interview 
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II). For the bigger Sparkasse, interviewee III stressed the need of proprietary trading to “generate 
revenue via speculation” as compensation for a slackening credit business from the 1990s onwards. 
 
Figures 5 illustrates the development of my next three indicators, all concerning the assets side of 
the balance sheet. In parts, they reflect the same trends as the composition of the earnings state-
ments, although with some important restrictions. For both Sparkassen we can identify a constant, 
if not growing percentage of securities in total assets of 20-30 %. Yet, while KölnBonn, in accordance 
with its decreasing income from securities, finally reduced its share to 12 %, Bad Honnef maintained 
a high level despite a similar slowdown of profitability. This can be partly understood as a combined 
result of deindustrialization and the aging demography of its constituency (Interview IV). The other 
two asset side characteristics of market-based banking, a rise in claims on MFIs with a correlated 
trend of decreasing loans to non-financial institutions, cannot be confirmed straight ahead. Other 
than two or three years in the beginning of the 1990s, interbank loans played no role as assets for 
both savings bank. Their share remained flat or eventually became irrelevant, while claims on non-
MFIs constantly oscillated around the 60 % mark. This is in stark contrast to Germany’s big four 
commercial banks, where the same numbers changed from 20 % to 30 % (interbank assets) and 60 
% to 20 % (loans to non-MFIs) respectively (Bundesbank 2018a). However, to draw a full-blown 
picture, we have to unearth specific credit characteristics that are not represented in the balance 
sheet numbers available. One of them is the rise of private consumer credit in contrast to mortgage 
or long-term loans. Interview evidence confirmed a huge variation with regards to the socio-de-
mographic environment of each savings bank. Due to the relatively wealthy population of Bad 
Honnef short-term consumer credit always remained “underdeveloped”, because “if somebody 
wanted to buy a car, he very often paid in cash … while on the other hand there were savings banks 
in the Ruhr area where it was absolutely normal to take out a loan for every washing machine” 
(Interview II). Yet, there were always incentives and concerted initiatives within the entire RSGV 
to try to expand consumer credit and make it more attractive. Corroborating this assessment, in-
terviewee III further adds that due to the efflux of the classic consumer credit to new offers of 
direct financing by various retailers such as car sellers, overdraft credit became more and more 
lucrative for many savings banks. This connection between crowding out and debt entanglement 
was described as follows: “Consumers took out a loan from their car dealer and payed the monthly 
installment using the overdraft credit on their checking accounts … This model was way more 
attractive for us from a business perspective as interest gains were higher and administration costs, 
including regulatory standards, substantially lower” (Interview III). Both, consumer credit and 
overdraft are important aspects of the development I want to trace (Erturk and Solari 2007). 
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Figure 12: Bank assets in % of total assets, 1986-2016. 
 
Sources: Annual reports and Bundesbank (2018a); own illustration. 
 
 
In addition to untangling credit characteristics, it also makes sense to fan out the different types of 
securities held. Figure 6 depicts the composition of the thrifts’ securities portfolios. Here, two 
things stand out. First, in the case of Bad Honnef, a complete turnaround from corporate bonds to 
variable-interest securities took place. In the case of KölnBonn it is the other way round. Albeit the 
share of variable-interest securities initially rose from close to zero to almost 40 %, it subsequently 
diminished again and was nearly completely substituted by corporate and public bonds. When 
comparing savings banks to the country’s big private banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Post-
bank and HypoVereinsbank/Unicredit), it is at first striking that the percentage of securities in total 
assets has been constantly higher in the balance sheets of the thrifts. However, this is only one side 
of the coin. The other is that for the last couple of years, after reporting was made more transparent, 
the big four have been inflating their balance sheets with derivative assets up to a share of nearly 
30 % (Bundesbank 2018a). Yet, even when taking this into account, savings banks numbers con-
cerning total securities remain intriguing, albeit somewhat mitigated. 
 
Figure 13: Types of securities held in % of total securities, 1986-2016. 
 
Sources: Annual reports and Bundesbank (2018a); own illustration. 
 
The next three indicators conclude the MBB dimension of the financialization of banking. Figure 
7 reports the three main components of the banks’ liabilities sides and offers some interesting 
insights into this dimension. First, we can discern a general trend of a decreasing share of non-
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MFIs, which was especially prominent in KölnBonn and less pronounced in Bad Honnef. In both 
cases it has been eventually reversed after the financial crisis. Before, non-MFI liabilities dropped 
from around 80-85 % in 1986-90 to lows of 65-50 % in 2006-07. Although this development is not 
as stark as in the group of big banks, where respective shares continued to shrink, relative numbers 
are still impressive. Looking only at the thirty-year period since the mid-1980s, reveals a fall by 18 
% for the smaller and an astonishing 38 % for the larger thrift, surpassing the 33 % decline of the 
big four (Bundesbank 2018a). Even more compelling is the concomitant rise in liabilities to MFIs, 
that highlight the relevance of interbank loans, which, as we have seen above, did not play a relevant 
role on the asset side, but are of clear importance as means of refinancing. Having been almost 
non-existent in the beginning, their share rose to 22-27 % before ultimately coming down to 10 % 
within the last ten years. Again, the comparison to the dominant stags of the private sector is 
elucidating. We can identify an uninterrupted catch-up process, which cut the gap between Köln-
Bonn and the big four in half, before widening again. Even though overall number were more 
modest in for the Bad Honnef, the growth of interbank liabilities is undeniable. For smaller savings 
banks, this was usually associated with securing matching maturities on both sides of the balance 
sheet (SSK Bad Honnef 2000; Interviews II and IV), larger Sparkassen tapped the market to under-
pin their balance sheet explosion since the second half of the 1990s (figure A2, appendix) and 
expand proprietary trading activities (Interview V). However, in both cases, albeit to different de-
grees, Sparkassen were seeking to appeal to a broad array of financial institutions for funding pur-
poses including private big guns such as Allianz or other institutional investors (Interview II; SSK 
Köln 2004). The final indicator, securitized liabilities, reveals a substantial difference between the 
two thrifts. As mentioned, German savings banks cannot raise outside equity. Yet, they can sell a 
variety of bonds and obligations. While these instruments played a minor role for the smaller SSK 
Bad Honnef, with maximum shares of 6 % in total liabilities, the larger SK KölnBonn made exten-
sive use of them with up to 17 % in 2003. It also sought to constantly expand the range of available 
products, for example via introducing a new money market bond (SK Bonn 1994). 
 
Figure 14: Bank liabilities in % of total liabilities, 1986-2016. 
Sources: Annual reports and Bundesbank (2018a); own illustration. 
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3.5.2 Dimension two: financial logic 
 
Turning to the FL dimension of my concept, the next indicator examines the installment of active 
risk management practices. Following the substantial changes initiated by the Basel II Accord in 
2004, a number of EU directives set the framework for respective adaptions by the member states. 
In Germany, a fundamental overhaul of the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) passed both houses in 
fall 2006. Besides new capital requirements regulations, addressing and reporting various sorts of 
risks were two central aims of this amendment (ZfgK 2006).11 Anteceding this legal prescriptions, 
both savings banks expanded their annual reports with special sections dedicated to risk manage-
ment. Throughout the 2000s these sections became longer and more detailed. In its 1999 report, 
the smaller thrift Bad Honnef states to have “established a risk controlling and management system” 
(SSK Bad Honnef 2000: 9). Four years later, the Sparkasse further highlights that “exceeding this, 
we measure and steer interest rate risk on the basis of simulations” (SSK Bad Honnef 2004: 5). The 
bigger Sparkasse upriver also mentions to have implemented Value-at-Risk (VaR) measurement 
(SSK Köln 2004) and to apply “standardized credit rating procedures” (SK Bonn 2005: 10). How-
ever, it would be shortsighted to interpret these developments only in reaction to stricter regulatory 
standards. On the one hand every interviewee confirmed that a tighter political grip in this regard 
played an important role, up to a point, where the often commemorated “gut feeling didn’t matter 
anymore” (Interviews II and IV) and “even leading executives were no longer able to make loan 
commitments to longtime SME customers, for example help them through tougher times” (Inter-
view III). On the other hand, both smaller and larger savings banks had developed in-house ratings 
already in the 1980s and made use of derivatives like interest rate and currency swaps way before 
they were bound to report them (Interview II, III and V). Externally, KölnBonn also went through 
the costly and time-consuming process of getting an individual rating from Moody’s while other 
Sparkassen were collective rated as members of the DSGV (SK KölnBonn 2006). In recent years, 
measuring techniques have constantly been refined and expanded. Bad Honnef, for example has 
been using newly developed retail credit scoring schemes and an early warning system (SK Bad 
Honnef 2011). Eventually, risk management not only became important for the thrifts themselves. 
It also opened up new business opportunities by offering municipalities and corporations advice 
concerning micro hedging (derivatives) and debt management (RSGV 1995; SSK Köln 2004).  
 
To develop, implement and execute the various risk management tools, you need specialized per-
sonnel. Together with organizational restructuring processes like the separation between front and 
back offices within each savings bank, a changing staff structure is the next FL indicator. An illustrative 
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example in this regard is the new structure of KölnBonn in the year 2003. There, the Sparkasse for-
mulated the clear functional differentiation between divisions like IT/services, steering, retail, cor-
porate customers, and “individual customers”, which usually means wealth management (SSK 
Köln 2004). Already a couple of years earlier, the savings banks undertook decisive steps in this 
direction with the opening of a new real estate center in Bonn and a “business consultancy and 
analysis” department in Köln, where experts in technology, environment and media served cus-
tomers (SK Bonn 1998; SSK Köln 1998). Another important aspect in this regard is the introduc-
tion or variable salary components, which were put in place by the bigger Sparkasse as early as 1994 
to “appreciate achievements via a modern system of incentives” (SSK Köln 1995: 30). Evidence 
suggests that the smaller thrift lagged behind since first hints can only be found more than ten years 
later (SSK Bad Honnef 2007). Larger savings banks sometimes recruited leading executives from 
private banks and also hired ‘people with skills in abstract thinking like biologists and physicists’ 
(Interview III). Smaller banks put the focus on in-house training and internal HR development 
(Interview V). Yet, despite this preference for internal recruiting, the scope of everyday activities 
that were part of a regular thrift banker, changed drastically. While many general and unskilled tasks 
were rationalized and automated, employees, encouraged to tackle higher fee earnings, “had to 
make a decision if they were salespersons, or as we used to say, could ‘transform from gatherers to 
hunters’” (Interview III).  
 
Very often the following two indicators, outsourcing and downsizing are intertwined. The first one 
basically considers the establishment of various joint IT and services firms, which were seen as 
threefold necessities: to increase efficiency and cut costs, to be able to use computational proce-
dures, which would have been out of reach for most thrifts individually, and to participate in future 
technological progress (Interview V). One of the first of such service companies was the SDZ 
Sparkassen-Dienstleistungszentrum that was founded by five savings banks, inter alia Bad Honnef, in 
1998 to “realize economies of scale by focusing on payment transactions … (and) centralized pur-
chasing of hardware” (SSK Bad Honnef 1999: 8). Moreover, even tasks like refilling ATMs or loan 
processing were outsourced to private service providers (SSK Bad Honnef 1999). A further move 
towards more centralization was then the creation of the Sparkassen Dienstleistung Rheinland (SDR) 
on the association-wide level of the RSGV in 2005, which was not only intended to perform call 
center and back office tasks for the entire region, but also attract other banks outside the savings 
banks sector as customers (RSGV 2005). Symbolizing the progressing outsourcing trend, today, 
there is even unitary national provider for all German savings banks, the Finanz Informatik in Frank-
furt, which itself is the result of a number of mergers over a nearly forty-year process (Finanz 
Informatik 2018). Table 2 presents data on downsizing as is reports numbers of employees, branches 
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and banks. Concerning the total number of savings banks in comparison to private banks, we can 
see that there has been a remarkable decline on the national level. While the overall decrease has 
been less drastic than the trend in the private sector, still, since 1996 almost one out of three savings 
banks and one out of four jobs have gone. Zooming in on the RSGV level, numbers on member-
ship shrinkage and branch closure even exceed the federal trend. On the other hand, reduction in 
employment has been less pronounced. However, data on full-time equivalents are sometimes not 
available as savings banks introduced part-time and early retirement options in the 2000s and have 
been using them extensively since then (SK KölnBonn 2006; SSK Bad Honnef 2005). Justifications 
of these actions on the side of the Sparkassen always refer to rising costs and customers preferring 
online banking over traditional means of interaction (General-Anzeiger 2017). There, it is interest-
ing that with the end of the 1990s, both savings banks began to explicitly mention the improvement 
of their cost-income ratios (CIR) as significant goals (SK Bonn 2001; SSK Bad Honnef 2000; SSK 
Köln 2003). This measure was supported by a nationwide DSGV strategy paper formulating a CIR 
floor of 60 %. Despite the considerable public outcry that nearly every article on branch closures 
in the local press reports and reinforces (e.g. Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 2016b), usually by accusing the 
thrifts of losing sight of their public service, no interviewee was able answer how profitable a Spar-
kasse actually should be.  
 
Table 2: Members (associations and sectors), branches (banks) and employees, 1986-2016. 
Institution Numbers / Branches Employees 
 1986 1996 2006 2016  1986 1996 2006 2016 
Private Banks 307 277 174 171  --- 246,000 199,850 175,500 
Savings Banks 589 607 457 403  218,917 288,445 257,000 224,671 
RSGV 60 51 35 31  31,848 36,700 34,404 29,575 
SK KölnBonn 176 155 131 106  5,046 5,100 5,189 3,997 
SSK Bad Honnef 5 5 5 3  103 109 125 98 
Sources: AGV Banken (2017); General-Anzeiger (2002; 2010; 2014); Kölnische Rundschau (2009); Kölner Stadt-
Anzeiger (2016a); Annual reports. 
 
 
The inability to effectively resolve this trade-off between cost efficiency and profitability on the 
one hand and doing service to the local community on the other, hints at a potential loyalty shift 
towards different stakeholders. To conclude this section on dimension of a financial logic, I present 
evidence on the final two indicators, internationalization and brand building. To some degree they both 
go hand in hand as highlighting an international business orientation helps building a perceivably 
modern brand. For both savings banks, various forms of internationalization can be traced back to 
the late 1980s. In this regard, the smaller thrift Bad Honnef relied more on the regional association 
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RSGV and the Finanzgruppe. Intriguing examples were for instance the signing of a Franco-German 
savings banks cooperation agreement in 1989 and its expansion to Spain in the following year 
(RSGV 1989; 1990). Throughout the 1990s such intra-European collaborations reached ambitious 
levels emphasizing export support and investment assistance for Rhenish SMEs, joint corporate 
finance solutions, enhanced offers for tourists and, finally, real estate services in popular Southern 
vacation destinations (RSGV 1993; 1994; 1999). The larger Sparkasse KölnBonn instead was always 
able to go beyond the RSGV network and make an international push on its own. While revenues 
from international business already pop up in the early 1980s, later on the asset of having interna-
tional representative offices via the states Landesbank, and expected increasing rewards from Euro-
pean activities speak an unambiguous language (SK Bonn 1994; 2000; SSK Bad Honnef 1987; SSK 
Köln 1998).  
 
Eventually, nearly all of the so far elaborated changes culminate in the modernization of the Spar-
kassen brand, a development that cut across all savings banks. Again, several sorts of empirical 
evidence can be brought up. For the smaller thrifts, brand building can be summarized by the equa-
tion of architectural upgrading plus product diversification within the Finanzgruppe. After modern-
izing their main branch office with a more spacious “customer friendly interior concept” (1997: 
33) in 1993, Bad Honnef also opened a new Real Estate and Insurance Center in 1996 (SK Bad 
Honnef 1997). A key aim, also for generating fee income, was to bundle a string of different prod-
ucts under one roof and, most importantly, under one brand. The red “S”, the symbol of German 
savings banks, should stand for every sort of service desirable: From the first checking account, 
over traditional forms of saving, securities trading, real estate finance, life insurance, private pen-
sions, consumption credit, international activities and complex products. Asked if there was a pro-
cess of re-branding or polishing the image of the savings banks, one interviewee extensively con-
firmed: “Definitely! This process started in the 1990s. We started to emphasize brand awareness 
more strongly. (…) Since then there has been an internal contest called ‘1 AHEAD’ (1 VORAUS), 
to incentivize all savings banks to increase their sales and marketing. (…) A lot of times we were 
among the best as both securities and insurance business were our strengths. (…) Winners were 
honored at an annual gala and board members of successful thrifts were promoted to national 
advisory committees to basically push this business further. (...) We could have done even more in 
terms of taking over insurance companies or credit card agreements (enumerating many strategic non-
decisions) to become even more distinctive as a brand” (Interview II). Other interview partners by 
and large verified this strategy (Interviews III and V). The larger Sparkassen even went further. 
Before a unified design was put in place for the annual reports of all Rhenish savings banks, which 
is itself also a form of corporate identity, KölnBonn presented itself as a trendy service provider for 
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the modern metropolis on the brink of the new Millennium. Glossy full-size pictures and co-oper-
ations with players from the local media and art scene dominated the print products, whereas naked 
numbers were relegated to the end (SSK Köln 1998-2002). Sometimes, the actual titles of the re-
ports were hidden under vague mottos such as “path-breaking” or “future-oriented” (SK Bonn 
2001; 2002). This optical image was then, finally, accompanied by a considerable expansion of both 
product portfolio and equity holdings. To name some of the most striking examples, KölnBonn 
developed new investment products like the KölnFondsStruktur, or participated in a variety of media, 
IT, real estate and consultancy firms. They furthermore assisted several firms in M&As or going 
public (exemplarily: SSK Köln 2001). One year, the Sparkasse even publicized its eco-audit, signal-
ling to be an eco-friendly and sustainable bank (SSK Köln 2004). While much of this was drastically 
reduced by KölnBonn after the financial crisis, as the focus shifted again towards more traditional 
activities (Interview V), it still holds equity in biotech venture firms and real estate developers (SK 
KölnBonn 2017). Complementing the section of financial logic is the last aspect of brand building, 
which sits in between PR and charity. By law, Sparkassen are encouraged to spend parts of their 
annual surplus for sponsoring cultural, educational, sportive or social purposes. Traditionally, this 
was mainly done by distributing money directly to the municipalities. Over the last thirty years, 
however, almost all savings banks have created more and more foundations. Circumventing city 
halls and councils, thrifts can now independently decide how they disseminate their funding. While 
KölnBonn, referring to its longstanding ethos of “corporate citizenship”, now has nine foundations, 
Bad Honnef set up its only Sparkasenstiftung with the commemoration of its one-hundredth anniver-
sary in 1997 (SK KölnBonn 2018b; Interview II). 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
With a history of more than 200 years, Sparkassen are the oldest type of banks in Germany. 
Throughout their existence they have contributed to the specific character of the German political 
economy in many ways. Yet, as banks and economic actors they do not remain unaffected by 
changes in the global financial context and sometimes even embrace them. A fact, which is very 
often overlooked or put aside. This paper has sought to broaden and deepen the perspective on 
savings banks in Germany and go beyond stereotypical accounts. Its underlying aim has been to 
shed light on the sectoral transformations which have taken place since the 1986 Big Bang and 
interpret them in the light of the general financialization trend in contemporary capitalism. Bringing 
together insights from the political economy of banking and studies on finance, I have developed 
a two-dimensional concept of a financialization of banking including a set of indicators for its meas-
urement. By applying this heuristic to two diverse cases of Rhenish savings banks, I have been able 
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to excavate evidence that challenges conventional views. On the one hand, savings banks have 
largely shifted towards market-based banking as fee and securities income, interbank loans and 
securities-based refinancing all play an important role for them. On the other hand, I argue, that 
they have also overwhelmingly adopted a distinct financial logic, exemplified by complex risk man-
agement techniques, the prevalence of CIR and VaR calculations, significant efforts of downsizing 
and outsourcing, or, eventually, the creation of an international, dynamic image, which symbolizes 
a potential shift in stakeholder loyalty. However, going into detail also reveals a more ambiguous 
picture. Contrarily to the aforementioned trend, German Sparkassen still support non-commercial 
purposes in their communities. They also secure large parts of SME financing and are present in 
rural areas where many other banks would to go. Furthermore, the very existence of the savings 
banks pillar helps to diffuse financial power and mitigate aspects of financialization in the German 
political economy, an important fact, worked out by Mertens (2017). Nevertheless, to only highlight 
the problems of Landesbanken, when speaking about financialization of public banking in Germany, 
is not sufficient (Scherrer 2017). Consequently, I argue that it makes sense to speak of a differentiated 
financialization, if we want to dig deeper and decipher what has been going on in the former poster 
child bank-based finance and patient capital. Due to their huge heterogeneity, larger thrifts vary in 
many ways from smaller ones, as do urban from rural ones (internal differentiation). In comparison 
to private banks, Sparkassen are still embedded in their regional context and confined by stricter 
political and legal provisions (external differentiation). Eventually, this paper makes a threefold 
contribution which simultaneously encourages further research: First, transferring the concept of 
a financialization of banking to other cases could yield in both theoretical refinement and empirical 
broadening. This, in the end, might help us to separate common trends from context-bound spec-
ificities. Second, having focused on savings banks, exemplifies an appreciation of the regional and 
public sphere of political economies. Despite them being crucial loci of socio-economic change 
they are very often left out of the equation in political economic research. Specifically, when dealing 
with financialization, regions and/or the state continue to be promising desiderata (Arestis et al. 
2017; Fastenrath et al. 2017; Lagna 2016; Schwan 2017; Wainwright 2012). Third and finally, iden-
tifying transformations in the not-sole for profit financial sector in Germany, might help us to 
conduct analysis on specific mechanisms of change. Also this could help us understand how far 
and in which way the German political economy has altered its course, as banking and finance have 
far-reaching consequences for political, economic and societal actors. In any case, the financializa-
tion of savings banks poses a pivotal development with an enormous potential for future debates, 
both academic and political. 
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Notes 
 
1. The five remaining private-law savings banks operate as joint stock companies but are not 
listed. They have a diversified shareholder structure featuring public, private and savings banks 
institutions. Three are in the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, while the re-
maining two are both located in the Northern state of Schleswig-Holstein. Dating back to the 
Second Schleswig War (1864) between Prussia and Denmark, Danish savings banks were 
largely independent private institutions whereas Prussian ones were public after the Savings 
Banks Act of 1838 (Hackethal 2004). As in many other countries, today, Danish savings banks 
are joint stock companies, especially after a new privatization law came into effect in 1990 
(Johansen 1994). 
2. Hardie et al. (2013a) and Hardie and Howarth (2013b) also include the securitization of a banks’ 
loan portfolio and the selling of derivatives (e.g. ABCP) via set up SPVs (shadow banking). I 
purposefully exclude this from my analysis for three important reasons: 1) MBB is developed 
from a financial systems perspective that is not completely superimposable on the analysis of 
individual MFIs. 2) Individual savings banks do not make use of these instruments. However, 
if taken as the entire Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (Savings Banks Finance Group, or short: Fi-
nanzgruppe), we can detect these activities e.g. via Landesbanken, where the BayernLB collat-
eralized outstanding debt of more than 30 savings banks from 5 different German states as the 
“Sparkassen Kreditbasket III” in 2006 (Ricken 2008).  3) Only the largest German savings 
banks are subject to IFRS reporting, whereas most of them still follow the German Commercial 
Code (HGB) under which certain instruments do not have to be reported in detail. This is also 
part of an ongoing debate about how to address risk in banking as a conflict between alternative 
banks and the EU shows (Bösen-Zeitung 2017; Sparkassenzeitung 2016).  
3. The possibility of a (gradual) privatization of German savings banks has been a heated debate 
that was regularly initiated throughout the past twenty years (Börsen-Zeitung 2010; 2012; 
Rheinische Post 2007). Especially in the wake of the feud over public guarantee obligation, 
savings banks were put under pressure (Seikel 2014). Examples for different routes of reorgan-
ization provide France, where savings banks have effectively become cooperative institutions, 
and Italy, where they exist in name only but are now joint stock companies (Butzbach 2016). 
4. In the original articles, in which Hardie et al. (2013a) and Hardie and Howarth (2013b) develop 
their concept of MBB, they do not specifically mention fee income as a core feature, while 
Erturk and Solari (2007) on the other hand emphasize this particular point, but do not call their 
concept MBB. In a strict sense, my adoption of MBB thus presents a synthesis of both ap-
proaches. 
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5. Measuring the importance of different categories of banks via market shares is not as straight-
forward as it seems. Sometimes, Landesbanken and savings banks are counted as the Fi-
nanzgruppe. In these cases, they always top private banks in terms of credit (Bülbül et al. 2013). 
Sometimes, the latter are decomposed into the “big four” (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, 
Postbank and Hypovereinsbank/Unicredit) and all other private banks, which then, of course, 
underestimates the size of the private sector. 
6. In fact, NRW is the only state which has two regional savings banks associations. Usually, they 
are congruent which the political entities of each state, or cover several states such as SGVHT 
for Hessen and Thuringia or the OSV for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Saxony 
and Saxony-Anhalt. 
7. Technically, savings banks cannot buy other thrifts. Formally, such a process is carried out by 
the smaller savings bank joining the business territory (Geschäftsgebiet) of the larger bank, 
whose statute is adjusted accordingly. 
8. Different base maps of German counties and municipalities were used for the creation of this 
illustration. They are all retrievable via the Wikimedia Commons archive and are subject to the 
GNU Free Documentations License, version 1.2. Special credit goes to the user “TUBS” for 
creating all original base maps. 
9. The quote stems from an interview with Gustav Adolf Schröder, the former longtime chief 
executive of the powerful Sparkasse KölnBonn. He became notoriously known for authorizing 
dubious equity and investment deals in the early 2000s with serious financial consequences for 
the savings bank. He was indicted and is currently still put on trial facing several charges such 
as bribery and embezzlement. 
10. I count bond yields as income from securities and not interest income. Commonly, there are 
ambiguously grouped as securities held on the asset side, but then listed together with interest 
income from loans in the earnings statement. 
11. Since the start of the new Millennium, there has been a plethora of legally codified financial 
market integration efforts from the EU level down to national jurisdictions. Kick-started by 
the Commission’s 1999 “Financial Services Action Plan” (FSAP), they were further fueled by 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. Notable EU texts were for example: The Single Banking 
Directive (2000), the Capital Requirements Directives packages (CDR I-III, 2006-2010), the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directives (MiFID I+II, 2004+2014). For Germany: several 
amendments to the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG, 2006 et seqq.) or the Financial Market Promo-
tion Act (Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) in 2002. 
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Appendix 
 
Sources: annual reports and Bundesbank (2018a); own illustration. Notes: data excludes yields on bonds. 
 
 
Figure A2: Indexed balance sheet growth, 1986-2016 (1986=100) 
Sources: annual reports; own illustration. Notes: vertical line denote important events: liberalization of the NRW 
savings banks act (1995); introduction of the euro (1999); Brussels agreement between the EU and Germany kicks 
in, effective abandoning of public guarantee obligations for savings banks and Landesbanken (2005); breakout of 
the global financial crisis (2007). 
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